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Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a well-established technique to assess 
the probability of failure or success of a system. Classical PRA does not consider the 
contributions of software to risk. Dr. B. Li and C. Smidts have established a 
framework to integrate software into PRA which recognizes the existence of four 
classes of risk contributors: functional, input, output and support failures. 
Input/Output failures have been shown to make up 57.4 % of the failures experienced 
during software development of major aerospace systems and have been at the origin 
of a number of major accidents such as the Mars Polar Lander. This research 
quantifies the contribution of the input failures.  More specifically, this dissertation 1) 
defines the concept of input failure, 2) studies the related propagation mechanisms, 2) 
estimates the propagation probability for different types of input failures, and 3) 
applies the fault propagation analysis to the framework of integrating software into 
PRA. 
  
The dissertation defines the concept of artifact as a reference point to identify 
expected inputs and consequently input failures (inputs which differ from the 
expected ones). Input failures are divided into value-related failures (including value, 
range, type and amount failures) and time-related failures (including time, rate and 
duration failures). Value failures are examined first. The concept of masking areas 
and flat parts is defined, and the dissertation proposes an Image Reconstruction 
Method (IRM) to estimate the propagation probability of input value failures. This 
method is proven to require less number of test cases than one that could be based on 
random testing to reach the same relative error. 
For the other input failure modes, the dissertation reveals how they transform 
to the data state error and formalizes their propagation criteria so that the IRM can be 
applied to estimate the propagation probability.  
The contributions are thus: 
1. Clear definition of the concept of input failure; 
2. Definition of a systematic process of identification and quantification of 
the contributions of input failures to risk; 
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1.1 Research Objective 
The objective of this dissertation is to define the concept of software input 
failures, study the propagation mechanisms for software input failures, and to 
estimate the propagation probabilities for different types of software input failures. 
Also, this dissertation tries to apply the fault propagation analysis to the framework of 
integrating software into probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a methodology consisting of 
techniques to assess the probability of failure or success of a system. In many modern 
technological systems, especially safety critical systems such as space systems, 
nuclear power plants, medical devices, defense systems, etc., PRA has been proven to 
be a systematic, logical, and comprehensive methodology for risk assessment. 
However, unfortunately, classical PRA practice ignores the contributions of software 
due to a lack of understanding of the software failure phenomena. This is in conflict 
with the fact that the software is playing an increasingly important role in modern 
systems. Hence, we are trying to develop a methodology to account for the impact of 
software on system failure that can be used in the classical PRA analysis process. 




• What can go wrong? That is what are the initiators or initiating events that 
lead to adverse consequence? 
• What are the consequences of things going wrong? 
• How likely are these undesirable consequences? Or what are the probabilities 
of the consequences? 
• How confident are we about our answers to the above questions? 
PRA has been applied in many modern systems, especially in safety critical 
systems. Unfortunately, the classical PRA ignores the contributions of software to 
risk. To account for it, a framework of integrating software into PRA was introduced 
by B. Li and C. Smidts [1-3]. In the framework, Li and Smidts introduce a software-
related failure modes taxonomy, in which the failures are categorized into input 
failures, output failures, functional failures and support failures. According to a 
validation of this failure modes taxonomy which was performed by NASA Johnson 
Space Center (JSC) [4], the functional failures and I/O failures are the two major 
failure modes. Input failures often occur in modern systems. One famous example is 
the Mars Polar Lander (MPL) failure. The Polar Lander was the first attempt to land 
on Mars since the Mars Pathfinder mission of 1997. The lander and microprobes were 
in excellent health during launch and the nine-month transit to Mars. On December 3, 
1999, about ten minutes before it was expected to land on the south polar region of 
Mars, the lander lost contact with Earth and it was never regained. The premature 
shutdown of the descent engine is the most likely cause for the failure of the mission. 
The three landing legs sent spurious signals to the MPL’s computer convincing it the 




used to slow the spacecraft down in the final seconds before landing. This case can be 
classified as an interaction failure and more specifically an input failure, probably an 
incorrect value. 
In their framework, Li and Smidts also proposed a testing-based approach to 
quantify the probabilities of end states in the event sequence diagrams (ESD). Their 
method is valid. However, their approach just quantifies the contribution of functional 
failures while other failure modes have not been taken into account. Also, just as its 
name implies, it is based on testing and the result is statistical. If an analytical or 
semi-analytical method could be applied, the time required for the quantification may 
be reduced. To do that, one should show how a fault residing in a software 
component is masked or cancelled. 
The understanding of fault propagation is an important field of study for the 
software community. Faults remaining in software may or may not cause the software 
to fail. Sometimes, software generates correct outputs even if the input provided to it 
is incorrect. 
Fault propagation is a complex process and the propagation probability, the 
probability that a fault arising in a location of the software propagates to the software 
output, is difficult to estimate. However, understanding how the fault propagates and 
its propagation probability is very important in probabilistic risk assessment because 
the probability that the software fails due to a fault can be expressed as the product of 
the probability that the fault is executed and its propagation probability. The 
reliability of a software component can be expressed as: 
1
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SWR  is the reliability of the software component under study, 
( )ip FM  is the probability that the i
th failure mode occurs, 
( )ipp FM  is the probability that the i
th failure mode propagates to the output, 
N is the number of failure modes which can occur in the software component. 
Fault propagation is a very complex process. Different failure modes may 
have different propagation behaviors. The research focuses on the propagation 
mechanisms for different types of software input failures. 
1.3 Approach 
There are many types of software failures and different researchers have 
proposed different software failures taxonomy [1, 3, 5-10]. In this dissertation, the 
taxonomy proposed by Bin Li and Carol Smidts is used. According to their 
taxonomy, the input failures can be categorized into two groups of failure modes: 
value-related and time-related failures. Value-related failure modes cover the 
characteristics such as value, type, range, and amount. Time-related failure modes 
cover the characteristics such as time, duration, and rate. Different input failures may 
have their own special propagation behaviors. In this dissertation, the propagation 
mechanisms for different software input failures are described. To reach the objective 
of this dissertation, the following steps are performed in order: 
1. Study the propagation of incorrect input values. It is reasonable to 
select the incorrect value as the first target of study, because the 




medium to propagate the fault. This step studies the propagation of 
the data state error and how this error vanishes during propagation. 
Following the analysis, a method to estimate the propagation 
probability of incorrect value failures is proposed.  
2. Study the propagation of other value-related input failures 
(incorrect input range failure, incorrect input type failure, and 
incorrect input amount failure). More specifically, this step analyzes 
1) how the propagation of those input failures transforms to the 
propagation of an incorrect input value or a data state error, or 2) 
how those input failures are detected or cancelled before they are 
transformed into a data state error. 
3. Study the propagation of time-related input failures. Time-related 
failure modes cover characteristics such as input time, rate, and 
duration. In this step, a computational model for the timing failure 
is presented. This step also describes the propagation of the rate and 
duration and formalizes the propagation criteria. 
1.4 Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation is organized as follows. The works that have been done and 
are being done by other researchers or groups on fault propagation are described in 
Chapter 2. Chapter 3 introduces the definition of an input failure, an artifact and the 
construction of the artifact. In Chapter 4, we describe the propagation phenomenon, 




failure. We also present the Image Reconstruction Method, a method developed to 
quantify the propagation probability of the value failure, including the procedure on 
which the model is based and an analysis of its efficiency. Chapter 5 explains how 
other value related failure modes (such as type, range and amount) are converted to 
the value failure or detected before the transformation. The propagation behavior of 
the time related failure modes (such as timing, rate, and duration) is explained in 
Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, we apply the method to an example. In the final Chapter, the 
limitations of this research and possible future research directions are stated. 
1.5 Contributions 
The major contributions of this dissertation are as follows: 
1. Provides a procedure to construct the artifact that is used as the 
reference point for identification of the input failure. 
2. Presents a procedure to generate the operational profile of the input 
failure for the software component in the system. 
3. Reveals the major contributors to the masking of the fault. Presents 
a method to estimate the propagation probability for the incorrect 
input value failure mode. This method is more efficient than 
statistical testing and can be applied to any location in the software 
instead of only the input. 
4. Presents a computational model for the propagation of timing 




can explain different behaviors for the “too late” and “too early” 
failure.  
5. Formalizes the propagation of duration failure as well as rate failure 
in different modes and with different buffer behaviors. These 
modes and buffer behaviors are commonly used in real-time 
systems. 
6. Describes how the other input failure modes such as amount failure, 




2 Review of Fault Propagation Analysis 
 
2.1 Importance of Fault Propagation 
Faults remaining in software may or may not cause a system failure. Indeed, 
the location that contains the fault may never be executed, or alternatively, the fault is 
masked somewhere in the software and consequently will not propagate to the output. 
Fault propagation is the set of mechanisms that will decide whether a defect in the 
software will cause a software failure. Fault propagation analysis is important in 
software engineering. It is used to predict where the fault may be located, and is 
useful for sensitivity and testability analysis. The sensitivity of a location is estimated 
from the execution, infection and propagation analysis at that location. Fault 
propagation probability is an important characteristic of the software/system since it 
directly relates to the software/system reliability. The probability that the 
software/system fails due to a fault can be expressed as the product of the probability 
that the fault is executed and its propagation probability. Summing up the 
contributions from different types of faults, one can obtain the unreliability of the 
software/system. Then, the reliability of a  software component can be expressed as: 
1




R p FM pp FM
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(Eq  2-1) 
Where 
SWR  is the reliability of the software component under study, 
( )ip FM  is the probability that the i
th failure mode occurs, 
( )ipp FM  is the probability that the i




N is the number of failure modes which can occur in the software component. 
2.2 Fault Propagation Analysis 
The process of fault propagation is complex and so far has not been clearly 
described. Most of the research to date has focused on the study of the propagation of 
the data state error. A data state error occurs when a value for one variable is different 
from what it should be. Michael and Jones [11] found that data state errors propagate 
homogeneously, "for a given input, it appears that either all data state errors injected 
at a given location tend to propagate to the output, or else none of them do." 
Thompson et al. [12-14] introduced the RELAY model to identify the propagation 
flow and the corresponding propagation conditions. The model provides insight into 
testing and fault detection, but it is extremely complex and may not be practical for 
the full analysis of real programs. 
A more general model called PIE was proposed by J. M. Voas [15].  In this 
model, the three conditions under which a fault will cause a failure are defined as 1) 
the fault must be executed (E), 2) execution of the fault must result in a data state 
error (I), and 3) the data state error must affect the remaining computation to cause an 
output failure (P). The PIE idea was applied in sensitivity analysis and testability 
analysis by J. Voas, L. J. Morell, K. W. Miller et al. [15-21]. Hiller et al. [22-24] 
introduced the concept of error permeability as the probability that an error in an 
input signal may permeate to one of the output signals. The authors used fault 
injection techniques to measure the error permeability in their experiments. Both 




they studied the propagation behavior at the code level. Nassar et al. [25, 26] studied 
propagation at the architecture level. They defined and estimated error propagation 
probabilities throughout an architecture using a generic matrix of entropies. Kao, 
Tang and Iyer [27] studied the hardware fault propagation as well software fault 
propagation using fault injection in the Unix system. Their experiment showed that 
the pointer faults tend to crash the system immediately if they are activated.  
Some researchers also contributed to the fault propagation although their 
works do not address directly to the topic and therefore they did not provide clear 
description. Guan and Graham [28] proposed an algorithm for locating failure sources 
by using knowledge of device structure and fault propagation paths, and through the 
use of sequential testing of system sub-devices.   
The following sections describe the major works which have been done in the 
field of fault propagation. 
2.2.1 Homogeneous Propagation 
In 1997, C.C. Michael and R.C. Jones conducted an experiment to study an 
important aspect of software defect behavior: the propagation of data state errors. 
They analyzed the behavior of three programs: dnet, b737, and nethack. Dnet is a 
small program which contains 439 lines of code (LOC). B737 is part of an automatic 
pilot system which contains 2,045 LOCs. Nethack is a terminal-based game 
containing about 75,000 LOCs. Their results show that data-state errors appear to 
have a property that is quite useful when simulating faulty code: for a given input, it 




the output, or else none of them do. The results revealed that the error propagation 
may be homogeneous. 
The error propagation is homogeneous when different data-state errors in the 
same variable have the same effect on the program’s behavior for a given input. 
Generalizing this concept, one can say that homogeneous propagation occurs for any 
data-state error if (a) all of the errors propagate to the output, or (b) none of the errors 
propagate to the output.  
These results are interesting because of what they indicate about the behavior 
of data-state errors in software. They suggest that data state errors behave in an 
orderly way, and that the behavior of software may not be as unpredictable as it could 
theoretically be. Additionally, if all faults behave the same for a given input and a 
given location, then one can use simulation to get a good picture of how faults 
behave, regardless of whether the faults one has simulated are representative of real 
faults. 
2.2.2 RELAY Model 
The RELAY model was introduced by Thompson, Richardson, et al. [12-14]. 
The RELAY model analyzes how a faulty code leads to a failure during the execution 
of some test data. In the model, the original faulty code is introduced at a location; the 
faulty code may trigger a potential failure and the failure may be transferred to the 
output.  
The transfer happens along the information flow chain. The chain could be 
represented as a sequence of tuples ( [ ], [ ], [ ])u x d x n x , where x is the number of tuples 




and d[x] represents the variable defined in location n[x]. If a node appears more than 
one time in the chain due to loops, it would be distinguished by a subscript. For 
example, one chain from node 3 to node 11 in Figure 2-1 could be represented as: 
(*,E,3),(E,F,4),(E,BP,5),(BP,B,6),(B,D,10),(D,out,11). 
Obviously, in one path, there could exist more than one information flow 
chain. For example, the chain (*,E,3), (E,F,4), (E,BP,5), (BP,C,7), (C,D,10), 
(D,out,11) shares the same path with the chain above. 
 
 





With the information flow chain, one can find out the transfer condition. For a 
single chain (see Figure 2-2), the transfer condition is easy. "The condition to 
guarantee the transfer along a single chain from some faulty node to a particular 
failure node is the conjunction of the conditions to transfer the potential failure 
within each node in the chain along with the condition to execute the chain."[12]. The 
necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee transfer within a single node is call 
computational transfer condition (ctc). The information must follow along the chain 
according to the definition. If any node in the chain ‘breaks’ (computational transfer 
condition is not satisfied), then the potential failures will be absorbed in the node, 
which is an example of coincidental correctness. 
 
Figure 2-2 Single Chain 
 
For Multi-chain (see Figure 2-3), the condition is more complicated. The 
condition for single chain is not necessary and not sufficient. The potential failures 
from different chains may be disappear in the nodes where they meet. In other words, 




in one code, when we calculate C =A+B, if we get A wrong with a value of 5 instead 
of the correct value of 2, and get 2 instead of 5 for B, then we will still get a correct 
result for C (7).  
According to Thompson, transfer set condition could be derived in 4 steps: 
1). Construct computational transfer conditions (ctc). 
2). Construct transfer route condition (trc). 
3). Construct transfer set path condition (pc). 
4). Construct transfer set condition (tsc). 
 
Figure 2-3 Multi-Chain 
 
The RELAY model is useful for deciding how to select testing data. For the 
small program, especially those with single information flow chain; it is easy to get 
the transfer condition with the RELAY model. For those with multi-chain, it will be 
more difficult to get the transfer condition. In the large program, it will be extremely 





2.2.3 PIE Model 
The PIE Model is proposed by Jeffrey M. Voas in 1992. It is a dynamic 
technique for statistically estimating three program characteristics that affect a 
program’s computational behavior. PIE analysis uses program instrumentation, 
syntax mutation, and changed values injected into data states to predict a location’s 
ability to cause program failure if the location were to contain a fault. 
PIE stands for propagation, inject and execution. The execution probability is 
the probability that a location is executed. An injection probability is the probability 
that a change to the source program causes a change in the resulting internal 
computational state. The propagation probability is the probability that a forced 
change in an internal computational state propagates and causes a change in the 
program’s output.  
2.2.3.1 Execution Probability 
Execution analysis is a method that is based on program structure. As such, 
execution analysis is related to structural testing methods. The execution probability 
is decided by the proportion of inputs that cause location l to be executed. 
2.2.3.2 Infection Probability 
Infection analysis reveals statistical information about the effect that mutants 
have on data state. It estimates an infection probability for each mutation. It is defined 
as the probability that a change to the source program causes a change in the resulting 
internal computational state. From the definition, the infection probability is related 




infection probability. The infection probability can be obtained by mutation testing 
[29-31]. 
2.2.3.3 Propagation Probability 
Propagation probability is defined as the probability that a forced change in 
the internal computational state propagates and causes a change in the program’s 
output. To obtain the propagation probability, Voas used a perturbation function to 
change the data state and then counted the proportion of those perturbations that 
cause a change in the output. 
2.2.4 Error Permeability 
Similar with propagation probability, Hiller, Jhumka and Suri introduced the 
concept of Error Permeability [22, 23] and applied this concept to the Propagation 
Analysis Environment (PROPANE) [32]. 
In their work, error permeability is defined as the conditional probability of an 
error occurring on the output, given that there is an error on the input. Then, for input 
i and output k of a module M, the error permeability is defined as:  
{ },0 Pr err in o/p | err in i/p 1Mi kP≤ = ≤  
From the error permeability, a set of related measures can be calculated. The 
measures calculated from the error permeability allow for an assessment of the 
vulnerability of software and its modules. After getting the error permeability for 
each module in the system, one could use Output Error Tracing or Input Error 
Tracing to analysis the propagation. Furthermore, the measures and analysis results 




would be suitable for error detection mechanisms and error recovery mechanisms. 
These methods can also pinpoint critical signals and paths in a system. 
2.2.5 Fault Propagation in Software Architecture 
Nassar, Ammar, etc, studied the fault propagation in the software architecture 
level. In their work, the Error Propagation Probability form component A to 
component B, EP(A,B), is defined as: 
( ) [ ]( ) [ ]( )( ), ' 'EP A B P B x B x x x= ≠ ≠  
Where [B] denotes the function of component B, and x is an element of the 
connector X from A to B. [B] is interpreted to capture all the effects of executing 
component B, including the effect on the state of B as well as the effect on any 
outputs produced by B. 
The definition of the error propagation given above uses the concept of 
conditional probability, i.e., one calculates the probability that an error propagates 
from A to B under the condition that A actually transmits a message to B. To bridge 
the gap between the conditional error propagation and the unconditional error 
propagation, denoted by E(A, B), the authors introduce the transmission probability 
matrix T. Its entry, ( ),T A B , reflects the probability with which the connector 
( )A B→  gets activated during an execution. Then, the unconditional error 
propagation can be expressed as ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,E A B EP A B T A B= × . To estimate the error 
propagation probability, the authors used the formula: 















Where the term ( , )A B BOR V S→ measures the average amount of redundancy in 
messages that B receives from A as seen by component B; i.e., based on the state 
transitions of component B, and hence we call this metric the observed redundancy 
(OR). The term ( )A BIR V → measures the intrinsic amount of redundancy in the 
messages that B receives from A; i.e., the amount of redundancy in messages from A 
to B as seen by component A, and hence we call this metric the intrinsic redundancy 
(IR). The authors had confronted the results of the analytical study against the results 




3 Input Failure and Artifact 
3.1 Definitions 
A “system” is an interdependent group of people, objects and procedures 
constituted to achieve defined objectives of some operational role by performing 
specified functions.  
A complete system includes all of the associated equipment, facilities, 
material, computer programs, firmware, technical documentation, services, and 
personnel required for operations and support to the degree necessary for self-
sufficient use in its intended environment. In a system, each component is connected 
with another component through an input-output channel. Figure 3-1 describes a 6-
component system with its connections.  
 
Figure 3-1 Input to a Software Component in a System 
A System Requirements Specification (SyRS) is a structured collection of 




Specification (SyRS) has traditionally been viewed as a document that communicates 
the requirements of the customer to the technical community who will specify and 
build the system. The collection of requirements that constitutes the specification and 
its representation acts as the bridge between the two groups and must be 
understandable by both the customer and the technical community. 
An “input” at time t, denoted as It, to a software component in a system is the 
information (D) received by the software component from other components in the 
same system, i.e., 1 2 ...
t t t t
NiI I I I= ∪ ∪ ∪ , where Ii is the input from the ith component, 
Ni is the number of components in the system that can provide information to the 
software component. The information can be a set of values, a stimulus, or an event. 
An “output” at time t, denoted as Ot, from a software component in a system 
is the information provided by the software component to other components in the 
same system, i.e., 1 2 ... o
t t t t
NO O O O= ∪ ∪ ∪ , where No is the number of components in 
the system to which the software component provides information. 
An “input failure” is identified right before the input goes through the 
software. As in the Figure 3-2, the input failure is identified at point A. 
 





A reference point is required to identify the input failure. What reference point 
should one use? It is natural to assume that the reference point may be the system 
requirements specification.  
For a safety-critical system, some states are defined as safe while others are 
defined as unsafe. In the following, the inputs that lead the system to safe states are 
defined as safe inputs, the remaining inputs are defined as unsafe inputs. To reach the 
safety goal, the corresponding reactions and operations on the inputs are described in 
the system requirements specification (SyRS). 
Now, consider a perfect SyRS. By perfect, it is meant that: 
1. (Completeness) All possible inputs are predicted. 
2. (Correctness) The corresponding operations for each input are described 
correctly. This means that for any given input, an implementation of the 
system that perfectly replicates SyRS will lead the system to safe states. 
Then the input domain can be represented as Figure 3-3, where A is the set of 
all inputs, R is the set of inputs defined in SyRS which are expected to lead the 
system to a safe state, S is the set of inputs which actually lead the system to safe 
states. The representation shows that under an assumption of perfect SyRS, A=R=S.  
However, a perfect SyRS does not exist. SyRS may be incomplete or its 
statements incorrect. For an imperfect SyRS, if the SyRS is complete but partially 





Figure 3-3 Input Domain with Perfect SyRS 
 
 
Figure 3-4 Input Domain with Complete and Incorrect SyRS 
 
If correctness is guaranteed, then all the inputs in R lead the system to safe 
states. Those inputs which are not in R may or may not lead the system to safe states. 
Hence, the Venn diagram can be modified as Figure 3-5. 
 
Figure 3-5 Input Domain with Incomplete and Correct SyRS 
 
It must be noted that, it is assumed here that no other failures occur. 
Otherwise, the inputs defined in SyRS may cause system failure and make the 




Normally, the SyRS is incomplete and not all statements are correct. Some 
inputs defined in R cause system failure. Then, the Venn diagram is modified as 
Figure 3-6. 
 
Figure 3-6 Typical Input Domain 
 
The shadowed partition (Area F) is the set of inputs defined in SyRS which 
are expected to lead the system to safe states but actually cause system failure. The 
partition F represents the failures caused by an incorrect SyRS (Requirements 
Failures). 
The existence of requirement failures in SyRS prevents us from identifying 
input failures solely on the basis of SyRS. Additional information is required to help 
construct a faultless reference point based on artifacts. By faultless, it means that we 
trust the artifact completely. Once such specification is obtained, input failures can be 
defined clearly. 
An “expected input” at time t, denoted as teI , is a set of inputs which are 
defined in the faultless reference point artifact at time t, i.e., { }1 2, ,...,te MD D D=I , 
where M is the number of possible expected inputs ( 1M ≥ ). Whether or not the 




failures occur in the downstream components, then the system will reach a safe state. 
Otherwise, there is potential for an unsafe condition. 
An “Input Failure” (or Input Fault) occurs when the actual input is different 
from the expected input, i.e., t te≠I I .  
3.2 Examples of expected input and input failure 
Consider the case of PACS and a fire scenario. Assume the system was 
designed in such a way that the guard may override the gate in case of extraordinary 
conditions if he/she so desires. The expected input for the system is, thus, the 
“Override by Guard” command or equivalent input.  Another issue is that the override 
command should be received in time (with the respect to the dynamics of fire) to 
allow people in the building enough time to safely exit. 
Assume that if the guard override command arrives before a time limit LIMITt , 
the system is safe, i.e., all employees and visitors are safe. Also, assume that the 
software is such that it allows inputs only during time windows of T ( LIMITT t> ) 











In this case, the expected input is: “Guard Override,” 0 LIMITt t<= <  and an 
input failure occurs if the actual input to the software arrives at a time superior to 
LIMITt .  Although in the software SRS, an input within the interval ,[ )LIMITt T  is allowed 
by the software component, such input will cause a system failure. Hence, the input: 
“Guard Override”, LIMITt t T<= <  is not an expected input. 
3.3 Construction of the Artifact 
The artifact is a combination of software requirements specification (SRS), 
system requirements specification (SyRS), implementation documents, testing 
reports, historical data and expert opinions. 
• System Requirements Specification (SyRS) 
A System Requirements Specification (SyRS) has traditionally been viewed 
as a document that communicates the requirements of the customer to the 
technical community who will specify and build the system. The collection of 
requirements that constitutes the specification and its representation acts as 
the bridge between the two groups and must be understandable by both the 
customer and the technical community. 
SyRS describes the role of the software component in the system and its 
interconnection with other components in the system. SyRS will help to 
determine if the Software Requirement Specification (SRS) describes the 
software behavior correctly. It is a major component of the artifact. 




An SRS is basically an organization's understanding (in writing) of a customer 
or potential client's software requirements and dependencies at a particular 
point in time (usually) prior to any actual design or development. It is a two-
way insurance policy that assures that both the client and the organization 
understand the other's requirements from that perspective at a given point in 
time. 
Normally, an SRS will address nine topics: interface, functional capabilities, 
performance levels, data structures/elements, safety, reliability, 
security/privacy, quality, and constraints and limitation.  The SRS describes 
the procedure by which a software component responds to inputs provided by 
the system. It is another major component of the artifact. 
• Hazard Analysis-Related Documents 
Hazard Analysis helps identify hazard scenarios that could adversely affect 
people, property, or the environment. 
• Implementation Documents 
The implementation documents include the high level design documents and 
detailed design documents. These documents help to determine if the software 
component is designed correctly according to the SRS. 
• Testing Reports 
Test reports contain the required behaviors of the software for every input in 
the test cases as well as the required output. They thus contain valuable 
system and software requirement information which may not appear directly 




• Expert Opinions 
Not all abnormal situations have been predicted in the foregoing documents. 
Expert opinions may provide helpful suggestions as to situations not covered 
in these documents based on accumulated knowledge. 
• Historical data 
Historical data is the information collected from failures reports describing the 
operation of a previous release of the system or of similar components in 
other safety critical systems. 
• Results from simulation  
Simulations are performed in the design stage or even in the execution stage if 
needed. They provide us an image of system operation. 
The major issue related to creation of the artifact is the systematic elimination 
of incorrectness and inconsistencies between documents. Also, the incompleteness of 
the SyRS and SRS should be remedied using the supplemental information discussed 
above.  The steps below can be applied to refine the documents at hand: 
1. Check the correctness of SyRS. The criterion used to determine correctness is 
whether or not the safety goal is met. In SyRS, the functionalities of all the 
components and their interactions are described. Check if the functionalities 
of the components meet the safety goal. Fix the procedures which are 
determined to be incorrect. 
2. Check the SRS according to the SyRS. The purpose of this step is to 1) check 
the completeness of functionalities of the software components according to 




components connected with the software, and check the correctness of the 
descriptions about the software procedures. 
3. Check the implementation documents according to the SRS. The step is to 1) 
check the correctness of the implementation documents according to the SRS, 
and 2) record the redundant or additional functionalities. The redundant or 
additional functionalities are introduced by the designers or developers for 
some purpose. They do not influence the software component behavior 
according to the SRS, but they may cause software component failure in some 
special scenario that is unknown at this point. 
4. Investigate the testing reports. Check if the results are correct according to the 
implementation documents. 
5. Check the completeness of SyRS. Investigate the historical data; if there are 
some scenarios that may cause system failure and are not addressed in SyRS, 
append those scenarios and the corresponding handling procedures. 
Determining the corresponding handling procedures may require referring to 
expert opinions and lessons learned. 
Steps 1-5 are typically performed as part of the software quality assurance 
activities that accompany the development of a software code. 
3.4 Construction of the Operational Profile 
An operational profile is a description of distribution of inputs that may occur 




It is very difficult to generate the operational profile for the software 
components, especially for the sub-software components. To estimate the propagation 
probability, two OPs are required: fOP  and eOP , represents the operational profile for 
the input failure and expected input respectively.  
Generally, the operational profile for the input failures is defined as{ , ( )}PI I , 
where I  is the set of input failure and ( )P I  is the set of probabilities ofI . Hence, to 
construct an operational profile for an input, two steps should be performed: 
1. Determine the possible value for the input. 
2. Determine the probability for each value. 
In the following sections, we discusses the operational profile generation for 
expected input and input failure in turn. 
3.4.1 Generation of the expected input Ie 
To determine the expected inputs space for the software component, one has 
to rely on the artifact. The process of retrieving expected inputs from the artifact is 
given below. The behavior of the upstream components defines the operational 
conditions, PIi for the ith software component. Given these conditions, the artifact 
returns the expected inputs. Consider the artifact as one database, the process to 
obtain expected inputs can be expressed as: 
, SELECT  
           FROM 











,e iI  is the set of expected inputs for the i




iPI  represents the previous operation information before the i
th software 
component is executed. 
For instance, in PACS, one of the scenarios found in the ESD for the fire 
initiator is “the fire protection system failed; emergency exit failed; guard was not 
there; and a user’s (Yuan) card was swiped (as shown in Figure 3-8).” We also know 
that the fire started 20 minutes ago.  Now, what is the expected input for the software 
component “Enter PIN”? 
The Artifact is composed of safety analyses results and the SRS.  
The Artifact (i.e., here, the safety analysis results) shows that “If the fire 
started 20 minutes ago, only 5 minutes are left for Yuan to safely exit the building.”   
 
Figure 3-8 Example Scenario 
 
To further define the expected input, we turn to the SRS (the second part of 
the Artifact) and find the following information: 
If all four digits from the PIN have been entered, the software will compare it 
with the PIN number which was retrieved from the security file during the reading of 
the ID card. On successful comparison, the software will open the gate (described 
later); otherwise, it will post the message “INVALID PIN” to the user’s display.  
 
The previous operation information before the software component “Enter 
PIN” is that “Yuan’s card is swiped.” We check the security file stored in the system. 




then be retrieved. This PIN is 2222. Combining this information with the information 
retrieved from the safety analyses results, one can obtain the expected input (PIN = 
2222, before 5 minutes). 





111111111 Yuan 2222 
222222222 Manuel 3333 
……… ……… ……… 
 
The probabilities for the expected inputs will be determined along with the 
generation of fOP  discussed in the following sections. 
3.4.2 Generation of an Operational Profile for Input Failures 
The input comes from the upstream components: hardware components, 
software components, or human components. OP  can be therefore considered as the 
combination of output distributions from hardware, software and human, denoted as 
{( , ( ))}hw hw hwI P I=OP , {( , ( ))}sw sw swI P I=OP , and {( , ( ))}human human humanI P I=OP  
respectively. 
3.4.2.1 Generating OPhw  
Hardware failures occur due to incorrect design, manufacture or wear down. 
To generate the operational profile contributed by the upstream hardware 
components, the following steps may be useful: 
Step 1.  Identify the upstream hardware components which may provide 
inputs to the software component. 
Step 2.  Find the failure mechanisms for each hardware component from the 




Step 3.  Model the behavior of the hardware components for each failure 
mechanism and the normal behavior without any hardware failures. 
Step 4.  Determine the input failure space for the software component and 
quantify the probabilities with the model developed in step 3 and the 
operational profile of the hardware component. 
The detailed description of each step is discussed in turn in the following 
paragraphs. 
Step 1. In this step, only hardware components, which provide inputs to the 
software component directly, as defined in the system abstraction, are considered. 
Step 2. The failure mechanisms for the hardware component may not be noted 
in the hardware user manual. To find out all the failure mechanisms, one should 
contact the manufacturer or collect information from the market reports like products 
review. These types of documents contain description about the possible failure 
mechanisms and their failure rates. 
Step 3. This is the most difficult step. The normal behavior model can be 
developed according to the functionality of the hardware component. Among the 
hardware failure modes, some may cause system failure directly.  Modeling the 
behaviors for different failure modes may require help from hardware designers. 
Step 4. Once the models developed in step 3 are obtained, one can feed the 
operational profiles of input to the hardware components into the model. Record their 
outputs and associated occurrence and generate the operational profile for each mode. 




can be obtained by combining all the sub operational profiles of all the hardware 






Figure 3-9 Generating OPhw 
 
 
3.4.2.2 Generating OPsw 
Generating swOP  is similar to generating hwOP . To represent software behavior, 
two models should be considered. The first model corresponds to the behavior of the 
software in the absence of support failures. Such a model representates the software 
implementation or the actual code. The second accounts for support failures.  During 
software execution, support failures may arise that will cause changes in software 







Figure 3-10 Generating OPsw 
3.4.2.3 Generating OPhuman 
Actually, human failures influence the software component through hardware 
components. Methods to model human behavior include cognitive models, human 
reliability models. Humans provide input to software components through hardware 
components (like keyboard and mouse). Hence, the failures of such hardware 
components should be considered when building the human models. This means that 
both the normal and abnormal hardware behavior should be modeled into the normal 
and abnormal human behavior model. In addition, one can use the results of expert 
opinion or experiments to build the profile. 
 
3.4.2.4 Generating OPe and OPf from OPhw, OPsw, and OPhuman 
The input space to a software component is the Cartesian product of input 
spaces from the upstream hardware, software, and human components, i.e.,  
hw sw human= × ×I I I I  
Where 
Ihw, Isw, and Ihuman are the input spaces from the hardware, software, and 




Similarly, the operational profile is given as: 
 { , ( )} {( , , ), ( ) ( ) ( )}hw hw human hw sw humanP I I I P I P I P I= = • •OP I I  
This expression assumes independence between the input variables from 
hardware, software and human. 
Given hwOP , swOP , and humanOP , one can obtain the operational profiles for 
input failures and expected inputs using the following two steps: 
1. Subtract the expected inputs from the operational profile. The input 
space is divided into expected inputs space, eI , and input failures space 
f e e= =I I\I I  
2. Normalize the distributions in the expected inputs space and input 
failure space respectively to obtain the operational profiles for 
expected inputs and input failures.  
The input profile for one component depends on its upstream components. 
When generating the operational profiles for all the components in the system, one 
needs to generate the operational profile for the most upstream component and then 
the one for the next component, etc. 
3.5 Types of Input Failures 
Input Failures can be divided into two groups: value-related failures and time-
related failures (as shown in Figure 3-11). Value-related failures cover the 




characteristics such as time, rate, and duration. For each characteristic, there are one 
or more failure modes. 
 
Figure 3-11 Input Failure Modes 
Input Failures











































4 Fault Propagation of Incorrect Input Value 
4.1 Data State and Data State Error 
The fault is transferred through the data state (or program internal state). 
Different researchers have provided different definitions of the data state. In [33], 
Daran et al. defined the program internal state as: 
 
Their definition is different from Zeil’s definition for program state [34] that 
does not include the program counter, i.e., ( ) ( ){ }1 1var , ,......, var ,n nPS val val= . 
Daran’s definition is similar to Voas’s definition for program data state [15]: 
 
The difference lies in the fact that, in Daran’s definition, all variables of the 
program data state have undefined values before a program execution on an input 
begins. However, when studying fault propagation in a software component, these 
two definitions can be considered as consistent. 
A program data state is a set of mappings between all variables 
(declared and dynamically allocated) and their values at a point 
during execution. In a data state we include both the program input 
used for this execution and the value of the program counter. 
The program internal state at a point during execution is defined by 
the values (val) of all variables (var) and the value (x) of the program 
counter (PC) which indicates the next instruction to be executed, i.e., 




A data state error occurs when a variable/value pairing in a data state is 
different from the expected variable/value pairing that is determined by an oracle. 
4.2 Information Flow Transfer 
When a data state error occurs, it may affect the next data state via an 
information flow that includes data dependent transfers and control dependent 
transfers. The data dependence transfer will change some value of the variables, while 
control dependence transfer may change the value of the program counter that 
indicates the location of the next operation. 
4.2.1 Data Dependent Transfer 
A node q is data dependent on a node p if and only if there is a definition for 
V at node p and V is used at node q. As this example, A is defined at node 1, and B is 
defined at node 2 using A. Hence, B is data dependent on A. Similarly, C is data 











4.2.2 Control Dependent Transfer 
A node q is control dependent on a node p if and only if p is the conditional 
judgment point for q. For example, in Figure 4-2, the node “c=0” is control dependent 









Figure 4-2 Control Dependent Transfer 
4.3 Propagation Behavior 
4.3.1 Error Flow Model 
If no fault has executed and infected the program data state, one correct data 
state will transfer to another correct data state, and so forth and so on, till the correct 
output. If one fault is executed and infects the data state, the correct data state will be 
corrupted and cause a data state error. If the data state error is masked or cancelled 
during the remaining computation, it will transfer back to the correct data state; 






Figure 4-3 Error Flow Model 
4.3.2 Cancellation Mechanisms 
Cancellation is commonly referred to as coincidental correctness. For 
instance, variable "a" carries a faulty value -2 instead of the correct value 2. After the 
execution of an assignment a a= , the variable "a" contains a correct value 2. In 
other words, the fault has been cancelled. In software, normally, the outputs are only 
a subset of the total variables defined in the software. The correctness of the output 






Variable "a" carries a faulty value -2 instead of the correct value 2. After the 
execution, the output variable "b" is correct. However, according to the definition of 




from the correct data state ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, 2 , , 2 , ,a b PC x . In this dissertation, if the states of 
all the output variables are correct, the fault is treated as cancelled. 
4.3.3 Major Contributors of Masking 
When an input failure occurs, it is propagated to the output through the 
remaining program, f, iff ( ) ( )e ff I f I≠ . The propagation is directly related with the 
remaining function f. Some functions can tolerate/mask all the faults, e.g., 
( ) constantf I = , while some functions propagate all the faults, e.g. ( )f I I= . Indeed, 




Figure 4-4 Propagation Behavior 
Case 1, equation ( ) ( )e ff I f I=  cannot hold due to the restriction f eI I≠ , i.e., 




Case 2, equation ( ) ( )e ff I f I=  holds if I  and eI  are chosen from the set {b, 
c, d} respectively, i.e., every ( , )e fI I  (and vice versa) pair, i.e., (b, c), (b, d) or (c, d), 
will hold the equation. 
Case 3, equation ( ) ( )e ff I f I=  holds if I  and eI  are chosen from the points 
in flat part L or points e or f. The flat part means that the region is insensitive to the 
faulty variable x: the points in the region generate the same function value. 
If the function is continuous, the probability that the input data will fall into 
the line L is much greater than the probability that the input data will actually be 
equal to the points listed in case 2 and case 3. Therefore, the flat parts of the function 
are the main contributors to the masking of the fault. This can be proved by the 
following theorem. 
 
Proof: Assume x* is the true value used in the function f(x), then the 
probability that a fault is masked in the function is equal to the probability that the 





x xx x dδ δ⎡ ⎤− + =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, where 0 1ixδ< < . The probability that the false data falls in 
the interval di, i=1, 2, …, N is: 
Theorem: Given a continuous function f(x), x∈D, if 
*)()(   N0 ,.....3,2  ,   ,* xfxfthatsuchNiDxDx ii =∞<≤=∈∃∈∀ , 











[ ]1 2x max x , ...... Nx xδ δ δ δ= , 
1 2max[ , ...... ]Np p p p= , 
i is the probability density in x , 1,2......ip i N= , 
















Although the computer can only provide a discrete representation and 
therefore δx can never be 0, the probability above can still seen as 0, because δx is 
extremely small and insignificant. 
In fact, a computer is only capable of storing a floating-point number to a 
fixed number of decimal places. In every computer, there is a smallest number,η , 
when added to a number of order unity gives arise to a new number1. Hence, every 
floating-point operation incurs a round-off error of ( )O η which arises from the finite 
accuracy to which floating-point numbers are stored by the computer. Fortunately, 
η is small enough and can be ignored in the computation. For example, the precision 
for the double floating number is about 162.2 10−× . Hence, the flat parts are the only 
regions that contribute to the non-propagation. The flat part discussed is the 
                                                 




insensitive region L with regard to the faulty input variable x, 
i.e., ( ) ( ), ,i j i jf x f x x x L= ∈ .  
The concept of the flat part is extensible for the multiple input faults. If more 
than one input variable is incorrect, e.g., x1, x2, …, xk are incorrect, the flat part with 
regard to these false input variables can be defined as region L in which 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( , ,..., ) ( , ,..., ),( , ,..., ), ( , ,..., )i i ki j j kj i i ki j j kjf x x x f x x x x x x x x x L= ∈ . Similarly, the 
flat parts are the only regions that can mask multiple input faults. 
4.3.4 Multi-layer Traps 
A software application may contain more than one flat part distributed in 
different components inside. The fault which falls in one flat part may also fall in 
another flat part. In other words, the flat parts of one component may fall in some of 
the flat parts of the remaining components in the software. For example, in a two-
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In the first component, [ ]0 8,10x ∈  is the flat part and 1 9x >  is the flat part in 
the second component. The flat part of the first component falls in the flat part of the 
second component because x1 = 16 > 9. This phenomenon is called a multi-layer trap 
(see Figure 4-5). Similar to the tree data structure in computer science, each trap (flat 
part) has zero or more child traps (sub-traps) that come from the previous functions. 




called root trap. A child trap has at most one parent trap. Traps without children are 
called leaf traps. The existence of multi-layer traps makes it difficult to describe and 





Figure 4-5 Multi-Layer Trap 
4.3.5 Potential Mask Area and Potential Propagate Area 
Different flat parts may have the same function value. Those flat parts with 
the same function value should be considered as one group. To distinguish the flat 
parts with different function value, we make the following definitions. 
 
Based on the definition, an input domain may contain several PMAs and only 
one PPA. As shown in Figure 4-6, the input domain contains two PMAs. PMA1 
consists of two flat parts while PMA2 consists of only one flat part. The area other 
than the two PMAs is the PPA. 
Potential Mask Area (PMA): A Potential Mask Area is the combination of the 
one or more flat parts in the input domain that map to the same result in the 
output. 
Potential Propagation Area (PPA): The Potential Propagation Area is the 




Once all PMAs and PPA are identified, the propagation behavior can be 
determined. Whether a fault is propagated to the output is decided by the location of 
the function itself and the location of correct and incorrect input. Based on their 
location, four categories are identified. 
1) Both correct input and incorrect input fall in the same PMA. Since both the 
incorrect input and the correct input have the same function value in the output, the 
fault will NOT propagate to the output. 
2) Correct input and incorrect input fall in different PMAs. Based on the 
definition of PMA, different PMAs have different function values, and the fault will 
propagate to the output. 
3) Both correct input and incorrect input fall in PPA. Because there is no flat 
part in the PPA, the propagation that they have the same output is considered as 0. 
Hence, the fault will be revealed in the output. 
4) Correct input and incorrect input fall in one PMA and PPA respectively. 
The fault will be propagated as that in case 3. 
Only when both correct input and incorrect input fall in the same PMA, can 
the fault be masked. The four categories above can be summarized as the PMA-PPA 
matrix (see Table 4-1). When the correct input and the incorrect input change their 
location with each other, the propagation behavior will not change, so the matrix 










Figure 4-6 PMA&PPA 
 
Table 4-1 PMA-PPA Matrix 
 PMA1 PMA2 …… PMAN PPA 
PMA1 N P P P P 
PMA2 P N P P P 
…… P P N P P 
PMAN P P P N P 
PPA P P P P P 
P: propagate N: non-propagate 
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tip  is the probability that the correct input falls in PMAi, 
wip  is the probability that the incorrect input falls in PMAi, 
N is the number of PMAs. 
4.3.6 Single Fault and Multiple Faults 
Normally, the input vector includes more than one variable, therefore two 
distinct cases should be considered: 1) Only one of the input variables is incorrect 
(single input fault), and 2) More than one input variable is incorrect (multiple input 
faults). Single faults happen more frequently than multiple faults.2 
In the case of single input fault, the variables other than the incorrect input 
variable can be seen as parameters. For example, for a system with N input variables 
{x1, x2… xN}, if x1 is the variable that carries the fault, then {x2, x3… xN} can be seen 
as the parameters of the system. In the output density distribution, some impulses can 
be seen and their corresponding probabilities are the function of {x2, x3, … , xN}. 
Therefore, the non-propagation probability (npp) of the system for the false input 



















In the case of multiple input faults, assuming the false input variables are x1, 
x2, …, xk, the non-propagation probability for these multiple input variables is: 
                                                 
2 If the input variables are independent of each other, the probability that N variables are incorrect at 
the same time is pN (p is the probability that one variable is incorrect). Customarily, p is a small 

























pti is the probability that the true value falls in the ith impulse given xk+1, .., xN, 
pwi is the probability that the incorrect value falls in the ith impulse given xk+1, 
.., xN. 
4.4 Propagation Probability Estimation 
4.4.1 Probability Representation and System Overview 
Because all the points in one flat part share the same function value, there is a 
corresponding impulse in the function density distribution (whose value is equal to 
the probability that the point falls in the flat part). If several flat parts share the same 
function value, the value for the impulse is the probability that the point falls in any 
one of the flat parts.  
However, not all the flat parts can be reflected in the output density 
distribution. As another two-component-system demonstrated below, in the density 
distribution of variable x1, there is one impulse (x1 = 1) corresponding to the flat 
part 0 1x≤ ≤ , and in the density distribution of x2, the impulse disappears. This 
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To avoid handling this difficulty, the whole system is considered as one 
component. Looking backward from the output of the system (see Figure 4-7), some 
impulses will be seen in the system probability density distribution if some root traps 
exist in the system. These impulses are independent although their properties (single- 
or multi-layer) are unknown. In fact, it is not necessary to know their properties. The 
impulses in the output density distribution represent the root traps for the whole 
system and they contain complete information on non-propagation probability. 
System
O
utput     distribution
View
 
Figure 4-7 System Overview 
As described in Section 4.3.3, only the flat parts contribute to the non-
propagation probability. When both correct value and incorrect value fall in the same 
root trap, the fault will not propagate to the output. When they do not fall in the same 
root trap, the fault will propagate to the output. This means that the non-propagation 
probability in the system can be estimated through the impulses (root traps) in the 
output density distribution. 
The impulses in the output density distribution are independent of each other, 











= −∑  
(Eq.  4-2) 
Where  
pti is the probability that the true value falls in the ith impulse, 
pwi is the probability that the incorrect value falls in the ith impulse, 
i is the index of impulses, 
N is the number of impulses. 
pti is calculated using the distribution of the true value and the area in the 
input domain that maps to the ith impulse. pwi is calculated using the distribution of 
the incorrect value and the area in the input domain that maps to the ith impulse. As 
shown in Figure 4-8, pti and pwi are calculated using different distributions and maybe 
different ranges. (Eq.  4-1) and (Eq.  4-2) are identical. Only the representations of the 











4.4.2 Image Reconstruction Method 
As shown in the discussion above, the propagation probability can be 
estimated once the impulses in the output density distribution are identified. It is very 
difficult to get the output density distribution. However, instead of using (Eq.  4-2), 
one could use (Eq.  4-1)  because it is easier to identify the PMAs. In this section, a 3-
step method called Image Reconstruction method is suggested. 
The method discussed consists of three steps: Data Generation, Image 
Reconstruction, and Probability Calculation (as shown in Figure 4-9). The system 
image exists since the system is defined. Its input range can be infinite except for 
undefined areas (e.g.,  f(x) = 1/x, x = 0 is undefined). The information generated by 







Figure 4-9 Image Reconstruction Method 
"Data Generation" generates input data for "Image Reconstruction." The 
image of the system is reconstructed in Image Reconstruction. In practice, it is not 
necessary to reconstruct the whole image; instead, revealing the flat parts that 
contribute to the non-propagation is enough. "Probability Calculation" is used to 
calculate the non-propagation probability. In "Probability Calculation," the 
operational profile of the input variables and the flat parts found in "Image 




4.4.2.1 Data Generation 
The function of Data Generation is to generate a set of input data for Image 
Reconstruction {Ii, i = 1, 2…N, N is the number of the input vectors} according to 
limitations/dependencies among these input variables, where 
Ii = {x1, x2,…,xM}i, xi is the ith input variable, i = 1, 2…, M. M is the number 
of input variables. The data on each dimension of input variables is ordered, i.e., 
1,, +< kiki xx . 
4.4.2.2 Image Reconstruction 
Image Reconstruction is the most important step of the approach (that is why 
it is call Image Reconstruction method), because the accuracy of the method hangs on 
it. Fortunately, it is not necessary to explore the entire system image. Instead, only the 
flat parts are relevant. The data used for flat parts identification is generated in the 
Data Generation. The flat parts are identified by using the definition of flat parts in 
section 4.3.5. During identification, the dimensions of faulty variables are explored. It 
is possible that some part may be misidentified as flat part (as shown in Figure 4-10).  
f(x)
Possible  flat  parts  identified  
Figure 4-10 Flat Parts Identification 
To prevent misidentification, the function value of one point (or more points, 
if required) randomly sampled in the possible flat part is calculated to confirm 




fault x is shown in Figure 4-11. The process for multiple faults is similar but more 
complex. 
 
Figure 4-11 Algorithm of Flat Parts Identification for single fault  
After the identification of flat parts, all the flat parts that have the same output 
are grouped as one PMA. Then the propagation probability can be calculated with 
(Eq.  4-1). 
4.5 Discussion of Image Reconstruction Method 
4.5.1 Dependency Analysis 
It is the system itself that dictates whether a fault arising in the input is 
propagated to the output. The input range and the probability density distribution 
contribute to the non-propagation probability. In Image Reconstruction, it does not 
matter if the input variables are independent or not. The data provided for Image 
Reconstruction is only used to reveal the system image. Then, the dependency 
between variables is handled in Data Generation or Probability Calculation.  
1. Generate the data { }1)],max(),[min(, +<∈ iiii xxxxxx . 
2. If f(xi) = f(xi+1), then [xi, xi+1] is considered a possible flat part. 
3. Randomly select one or more points from the sub-interval, if they also 
generate the same output, then [ ]1i ix x ++  can be considered as one flat part. 




Non-propagation probability depends on the range of the flat parts and the 
probability density distributions of the input variables; the dependency of only these 
two properties of the input variables, Range Dependency and Probability 
Dependency, are considered. 
Range dependency describes the limitation among the input variables. If two 
input variables, xi and xj, are independent, then for any given xi, xj has the same 










Figure 4-12 Independent Range distributions 
If the range of one variable jx  is changing along with another variable ix , 
then the range xi is dependent on jx , i.e., the range distribution of ix  is a function of 
jx  (as shown in Figure 4-13).  Sometimes, the range distribution of one variable is 














Figure 4-13 Dependent Range distributions 
   
One special dependent case (as shown in Figure 4-14) shows that the range 
value of jx  is clearly defined as a function of xi, i.e., ( )j ix f x= . In this case, the 
input vector nRI ∈  can be transformed to another input vector 1' −∈ nRI  which has 




Figure 4-14 Dependent Range Distribution (special case) 
 
Similar to the range dependency, the probability distribution of one input 
variable jx  may be dependent on another input variable ix . When one variable jx  is 
range dependent on another variable ix , it must be probability dependent on ix , 




The existence of dependency between variables increases the complexity of 
the non-propagation analysis. The range dependency and probability dependency are 
handled in the Data Generation and Probability Calculation respectively. 
If one of the input variables is incorrect, the variables that are range dependent 
on the variable must be incorrect, too. It means that a multiple input fault case has 
occurred. Data Generation generates data consistent with existing range dependencies 
and the data is used to identify the flat parts with regard to the dependent input 
variables. 
The probability dependency is handled in Probability Calculation. If the input 
variables are independent, the expression of non-propagation probability for the 






xR  is the domain of x,  
yR  is the domain of y. 
If the input variables are dependent, the expression will be modified as: 
( )




prob p x dx p x y dy= ∫ ∫  
Where 
( , )p x y  describes the probability dependency between x and y,  




4.5.2 Error Analysis 
To estimate the relative error of the Image Reconstruction method, assume k 
flat parts exist in the software system (for simplicity, further assume they have the 
same length). Also, assume that both true input value and false input value are 
uniformly distributed in the domain.  After dividing the input domain into N sub-





Figure 4-15 Error Analysis 
Divide the input domain into N sub-intervals, the non-propagation probability 
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(Eq  4-3) 
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(Eq  4-4) 
Where 
npp* is the real non-propagation probability and k is the number of flat parts 
in the software. 
Since npp* is unknown, it is impossible to estimate the relative error. 




points used to reconstruct the system image goes to infinity, the approximation 
function will be exactly the original function and the error will be 0. In practice, 




> . The method is 
then performed twice with N and 2N sub-intervals, respectively. If 
(2 ) ( )npp N npp N error− < , npp(2N) can be seen as the propagation probability that 
can be used to assess the system reliability. 
4.5.3 Efficiency Analysis 
This method was applied to one 10-component system (see Figure 4-16) for 
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The experiment is designed in Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 environment and 
executed on one computer with following configuration: CPU: PIII 500MHz, 
Memory: 256 MB RAM and OS: Windows XP (Professional Edition) with Service 
Pack 2. The results are shown in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2 Experiment Results 
 Image Reconstruction Method Random Testing 











100 0.701 0.000285 0.711 0.00034 
250 1.502 0.00030875 1.743 0.000468 
550 3.715 0.00031910 3.845 0.000369 
600 4.166 0.00032175 4.156 0.000315 
1000 7.25 0.00032835 7.611 0.000431 
 
Our method’s computation time is about the same as random testing for the 
same sample size/number of interpolation points. However, the result obtained from 
the Image Reconstruction method is more accurate than that from random testing for 
the same sample size/number of interpolation points. 
It is shown [35] that the required sample size for random testing can be 






(Eq.  4-5) 
 
Where 
p is the estimated probability, q = 1-p. 
r is the relative error 




For the 10-component system, the theoretical non-propagation probability is 
1/3000. So, with α=0.05, r=0.1 (550 interpolation points are required in our method), 
the sample size for random testing is 1152480; then, the required computation time 
is1152480 *7.611 8771 3.715
1000
= >> . Hence, the method is faster than random testing 
in this example. By solving equation (Eq  4-4), the number of interpolation points 




































The value of 
Testing
N
N  for different npp* and k is listed in Table 4-3. 




N  and thus the Image Reconstruction method is more efficient than 
testing. 
Table 4-3 N/Ntesting for different npp* and k (r=0.1, z=1.96) 
npp     k 1 2 5 10 
0.0001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 
0.001 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.010 
0.01 0.010 0.014 0.023 0.032 




0.5 0.143 0.203 0.321 0.454 
0.9 0.962 1.361 2.152 3.043 
0.99 10.094 14.276 22.572 31.921 
 
4.5.4 Scalability Study 
As described in the previous sections, the method considers the remaining 
functions as one unit. Hence, it can be applied to any system no matter how large the 
system. The difference between the application to a small system and a large system 
is only the amount of computing time necessary to estimate the non-propagation 
probability. 
The time (t) to estimate the non-propagation probability of a function f is 
related with the average execution time (τ) of every LOC, the length of the function 
(l), and the number of interpolation points (the number of sub-intervals) for all input 
variables (N). The relation can be expressed as: 
τNlt =  (Eq  4-7) 
 
For reference, we use the example system above (30 LOC) to estimate τ. In 
the example, the correct input variable y is divided into 1000 sub-intervals, and for 
every sample y, the incorrect input variable x is divided into xN  sub-intervals ( xN  is 
expressed as (Eq.  4-6)).  
Hence, the average execution time for every LOC can be obtained as: 
LOCmsLOC /1025.2sec/1025.2
1000*30*550
715.3 47 −− ×=×==τ
 
Hence, equation (3) can be approximated as: 




Table 4-4 shows the value of N for different r, npp* and k. 
Table 4-4 Number of interpolation points required for different npp*, k, r=0.1 
npp*  k 1 2 5 10 
0.0001 3897 5512 8714 12325 
0.001 1232 1743 2756 3897 
0.01 390 551 871 1232 
0.1 123 174 276 390 
0.2 87 123 195 276 
0.5 55 78 123 174 
0.9 41 58 92 130 
0.99 39 55 88 124 
0.999 39 55 87 123 
 
Then, for a large system with 128k LOC, the calculation time can be 
estimated (as shown in Table 4-5).  
Table 4-5 Calculation time (s) for different r, npp*, k, r=0.1 (l=128k) 
npp*  k 1 2 5 10 
0.0001 112 159 251 354 
0.001 35 50 79 112 
0.01 11 16 25 35 
0.1 4 5 8 11 
0.2 3 4 7 8 
0.5 2 2 4 5 
0.9 1 2 3 4 
0.99 1 2 3 4 
0.999 1 2 3 4 
 
4.5.5 Application for the different locations in Software 
In the above discussion, it is assumed that the fault occurs at the input. For 
faults arising within the software, the method can be applied from the location of 
occurrence through the remaining functions. Establishing the non-propagation 
relationship between the input and output can be used for the non-propagation 




The software is divided into head function y = f(x) and tail function z = g(y) 
from the location y under study (as shown in Figure 4-17). Although the fault in y is 
propagated/masked in the tail function, some non-propagation information can be 
obtained through mapping x to y with the head function y = f(x).  
Input x Output oy=f(x) z=g(y)
Location of fault
System
Head function Tail function
y
 
Figure 4-17 Non-propagation Analysis for a Fault located in the Software  
 
As shown in Figure 4-18, let Dx represent the domain of x. The range of head 
function y = f(x) is Dy, [min( ( )),  max( ( )),   ]y xD f x f x x D= ∈ . If Lx has been 
identified as the flat part with regard to x in Dx, i.e., 0( ( )) , xg f x z x L= ∈  then, through 
the calculation in head function f(x), there must exist region Ly satisfying 
[min( ( )),  max( ( )),   ]y xL f x f x x L= ∈ . Hence, Ly is a flat part with regard to y in Dy, 
i.e., 0( ) , yg y z y L= ∈ . If the value of the fault in location y and its true value belong 









. For the region outside of Dy, 
the identification process has to be performed again, because the behavior in this 




This information is very significant. If the propagation analysis has to be 
performed for different locations, much unnecessary work will not need to be 
repeated and one can reduce the workload consequently. Such kind of information 
can not be obtained in random testing; therefore the same sample size in every 













5 Fault Propagation of other Value-Related Failure Modes 
5.1 Type Failure 
An incorrect input type is one of the input failure modes. For example, if the 
expected input type is integer, and the actual input type is char, then an incorrect 
input type failure occurs. Since the propagation is performed via the data state, how 
the input type failure causes the data state error is the key question for the 
propagation of incorrect input type failure (as shown in Figure 5-1). 
  
Figure 5-1 Transform form incorrect type failure to incorrect value failure 
 
To answer this question, we need to know:  
1) What are the data types supported by the computer system? 
2) When is the date type checked? 
3) What is the action taken by the computer when a type mismatch occurs? 
5.1.1 Data Type 
The type in computer science is a set of values and some operations which one 
can perform on the set of values. Programming languages implicitly or explicitly 
support one or more data types; these types may act as a statically or dynamically 




Each programming language has a set of built-in primitive data types. At the 
same time, a language may also allow programmers to define new data types. The 
three basic elements of a specification of a data type are: attributes, values, and 
operations. The attributes distinguish data objects of the type; ANDthe values 
represent the possible values that can be taken by the data object of the type; the 
operations define the possible manipulations of the data objects of that type. For 
instance, a car data type in C++ is defined as: 
 
The attributes of the car data type are the dimensions (year, maker and price). 
The value of the data type is comprised of the sets of data that are valid values for the 
car data object, for instance, (1999, HONDA, 10000) and (1999, FORD, 11000) are 
the possible values for the car data type. The operations can “adjust the price.” 
The basic elements of the implementation of data type cover the storage 
representation and the manner of implementation. The storage representation 
represents the data objects of the data type in the storage of the computer during 
execution. The manner of implementation is particular algorithms or procedures that 
operate the chosen storage representation of the data type objects. There are three 









1. The operation is implemented as a hardware operation. 
2. The operation is implemented as a procedure or function subprogram. 
3. The operation is implemented as an in-line code sequence. 
Here, only the primitive types are discussed, because they are common in 
almost all the languages. Typical primitive types may include: character, integer, 
floating-point number, Boolean, and reference. Different languages may have 
different primitive types. 
In the earliest Intel processors, the floating point operations were not 
supported in hardware. This does not mean that these processors could not perform 
float operations. To perform float operations, the programmers had to use procedures 
composed of non-floating point instructions. Later, Intel provided an additional chip 
called a math coprocessor in which machine instructions were embedded so that 
floating point operations were performed much faster than when using a software 
procedure. The math coprocessor for the 8086/8088 was called 8087. The math 
coprocessors for 80286 and 80386 are 80287 and 80387, respectively. Since the 
Pentium generation, all 8086 processors have a built-in math coprocessor. Hence, 
floating operations are automatically supported. 
5.1.2 Type Checking 
Data storage representations that are built into the computer hardware usually 
include no type information, and the primitive operations on the data do no type 
checking. For example, a particular word in the computer memory during execution 
of a program may contain the bit sequence: 11100101100...0011. This bit sequence 




there is no way to tell. The hardware primitive operation for integer addition cannot 
check whether its two arguments represent integers; they are simply bit sequences, 
and the hardware operation must assume that they represent integers. A common 
programming error in assembly of machine languages is to invoke an operation such 
as integer addition on arguments of the wrong type. Such errors are particularly 
difficult to find because the operation does not fail in some obvious way. The 
operation “works,” but the results produced are meaningless. However, subsequent 
operations may continue to compute with the “garbage” result to produce more 
“garbage,” until the entire computation fails. Thus, at the hardware level, 
conventional computers are particularly unreliable in detecting data type errors. 
"Type Checking” means checking that each operation executed by a program 
receives the proper number of arguments of the proper data type. Type checking 
typically occurs in 3 stages: coding, compilation, and execution (as shown in Figure 
5-2). 
ExecutionCompilationCoding




Figure 5-2 Type checking in different stages 
 
5.1.2.1 Coding stage 
During the coding stage, programmers may want to check the types of some 
special inputs; they will then check the type of the input with some type checking 




example, in Visual Basic, in order to check whether a variant is numeric, the 
programmers may choose the following method (Figure 5-3). 
 
Figure 5-3 Example of Type Checking (Visual Basic) 
 
When programmers use similar methods to check the type, they know how to 
handle type mismatches, or the requirements specifications address the problem 
explicitly. Thus, a failure due to type mismatches will not occur3. 
Programmers cannot check the types of all variables in the program. Most 
type checking takes place in the compilation stage via static type checking and in the 
execution stage via dynamic type checking. 
5.1.2.2 Compilation stage 
Most languages can check the data type (static type checking). Static type 
checking is performed in the compilation stage and it becomes a primary task of the 
semantic analysis carried out by a compiler. When translating a program, the 
compiler collects information from declarations in the program into various tables. 
                                                 
3 On the other hand, error handling of type mismatches may directly impact the ability of an 
application to generate outputs within the time limit set by the system. 
‘get variant v 








Then, the compiler checks each operation invoked by the program to determine if the 
type of each argument is valid. The information required for static type checking is: 
1. For each operation, the number, order and data types of its arguments and 
results. 
2. For each variable, the type of the data object named. 
3. The type of each constant data object. 
In static type checking, the statically typed languages and dynamically typed 
languages behave differently. Statically typed languages include C, C++, Java, ML, 
Haskell, etc., while dynamically typed languages include Objective-C, Scheme, Lisp, 
Smalltalk, Perl, PHP, Visual Basic, Ruby, Python, etc. For example, in the following 
pseudocode (Figure 5-4), the statically typed languages will report an error while the 
dynamically typed languages will allow it to execute. 
 
Figure 5-4 Statically vs. Dynamically Typed Variable 
 
Static typing finds type errors reliably and at compile time. This should 
increase the reliability of the delivered program. Static typing usually results in 
compiled code that executes more quickly, because static type checking covers all the 
operations in the program statements, all possible execution paths are checked and 
therefore further testing for type errors is not necessary. When the compiler knows 
the exact data types that are in use, it can produce machine code that just does the 
right thing. Further, compilers in statically typed languages can find shortcuts more 
easily. 
var x; 
x = 0; 




In static type checking, some extra codes are inserted into the compiled 
program to invoke the conversion. Usually, the statically typed languages prohibit the 
narrowing coercions because they save the time used to determine the validity of the 
coercion so that an efficient execution is obtained. 
5.1.2.3 Executing stage 
Static type checking cannot prevent all the type mismatches. For example, the 
user may provide a string instead of an integer through a man-machine interface. 
Hence, a dynamic type checking needs to be performed. 
Dynamic type checking is run-time checking because variables can acquire 
different types depending on the execution path. It is performed right before the 
execution of an operation. In dynamic type checking, the type of a data object is 
indicated by storing a type tag. For example, the statement “double x=0.1;” defines a 
double data object which contains 0.1 as the double value and the “double” type tag. 
Then, in every operation, the computer checks the type tag of each argument first. If 
the argument types are correct, the operation is performed. Otherwise, an error is 
raised. After the execution of every operation, the appropriate type tag is also 
attached to the result. 
We study the incorrect input type failure at the code level. In other words, the 
executable code is available which means that the code can be compiled and, 
therefore, type checking in the coding stage and the compilation stage has been 




If the actual type of an argument is different from its expected type, then a 
type mismatch occurs. When a type mismatch is found, one of the two following 
actions is performed. 
1. The type mismatch may be flagged as an error, and an appropriate error action 
taken. 
2. A coercion (or implicit type conversion) may be applied to change the type of 
the actual argument to the correct type. The coercions are automatically 
invoked in some cases. For example, in C, for the operation: x*y, if x and y 
are type double and integer respectively, y is implicitly converted to type 
integer before multiplication is performed. Implicit type conversion, also 
known as coercion, is an automatic type conversion. Some languages allow, or 
even require compilers to provide coercion. 
5.1.3  Type Conversion 
Type conversion or typecasting refers to changing an entity of one data type 
into another. Most languages provide type conversions in two ways, implicit and 
explicit. In the case of implicit type conversion, the compiler is given the 
responsibility for determining that a conversion is required and how to perform the 
conversion. In the case of explicit type conversion, the programmer assumes the 
responsibility. An explicit conversion is applied to change the type of the actual 
argument to the correct type. The programmers invoke explicitly the conversions 
within a set of built-in functions. The programmers can cast an expression to coerce it 
to the correct type or the expected type. For example, (double) x can convert the 




There are several kinds of explicit conversions: 
• Checked. When the type mismatch occurs during execution, the program 
checks whether the destination type can actually hold the source value. If yes, 
the conversion is performed, otherwise, an error condition is raised. 
• Unchecked. No check is performed before the conversion. If the destination 
type can not hold the source value, the result of conversion is undefined. 
• Bit Pattern. The data is not interpreted at all and just the raw bit pattern is 
copied. 
The basic principle of coercions is not to lose information. Some conversions 
(like from a short integer to a long integer) result in no loss of information. Such 
coercions are called widening or promotions. On the other hand, some coercions (like 
from double to long integer) may lose information. Such coercion is called narrowing. 
The coercion could be allowed if the data object has an appropriate value. 
Different data types are stored differently as shown in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1 Storage of Data Type 
Type Size 
char 1 byte 
short integer 2 bytes 
long integer 4 bytes 
float 4 bytes 
double 8 bytes 
 
An integer can be directly expressed using bits as shown in Figure 5-5. The 






Figure 5-5 Representation of Integer 
 
The representation of a floating point number is more complex. IEEE floating 
point numbers have three basic components: a sign, an exponent, and a mantissa. The 
mantissa is composed of a fraction and an implicit leading digit which is always equal 
to 1 and as such is never represented. The layout for single (32-bit) and double (64-
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Figure 5-6 Floating Point Number Layout 
 
The type conversion operations from one type to another type are summarized 
as Table 5-2.  
Table 5-2 Type Conversion Operations 
Source Type Destination Type Conversion 
Char Short Integer Sign-extend. 
Char Long Integer Sign-extend. 





Char Double Sign-extend to long integer; convert long integer 
to double. 
Short Integer Long Integer Sign-extend. 
Short Integer Float Sign-extend; convert long integer to float. 
Short Integer Double Sign-extend; convert long integer to double. 
Short Integer Char Preserve low-order byte. 
Long Integer Float Represent as float. 
Long Integer Double Represent as double 
Long Integer Char Preserve low-order byte. 
Long Integer Short Integer Preserve low-order word. 
Float Double Change internal representation. 
Float Char Convert to long integer; convert long integer to 
char. 
Float Short Integer Convert to long integer; convert long integer to 
short integer. 
Float Long Integer Truncate at decimal point. If result is too large to 
be represented as long integer, result is 
undefined. 
Double Char Convert to float; convert float char. 
Double Short Integer Convert to float, convert float to short integer. 
Double Long Integer Truncate at decimal points. If result is too large 
to be represented as long integer, result is 
undefined. 
Double Float Represent as a float. If double value cannot be 
represented exactly as float, loss of precision 
occurs. If value is too large to be represented as 
float, the result is undefined. 
 
The conversion may cause a loss of information. The loss for different 
conversions will be described in the following sections. 




When a data object is converted from type char to numeric data types, it 
loses its property and produces “garbage” unless it is the programmers’ 
intention to perform these conversions based upon the contents of the 
requirements documents (in this case, there is no incorrect input type 
failure). The results in these conversions are not meaningful. Hence, we 
call the conversions from type char to numeric types or from numeric 
types to type char as meaningless type changes. Normally, these kinds of 
type conversions result in strange values of the destination type. The 
standard ASCII codes for the characters are shown in Table 5-3. 
Table 5-3ASCII Code 
Dec Hex Symbol Dec Hex Symbol Dec Hex Symbol 
32 20 space 64 40 @ 96 60 ` 
33 21 ! 65 41 A 97 61 a 
34 22 " 66 42 B 98 62 b 
35 23 # 67 43 C 99 63 c 
36 24 & 68 44 D 100 64 d 
37 25 % 69 45 E 101 65 e 
38 26 $ 70 46 F 102 66 f 
39 27 ‘ 71 47 G 103 67 g 
40 28 ( 72 48 H 104 68 h 
41 29 ) 73 49 I 105 69 i 
42 2A * 74 4A J 106 6A j 
43 2B + 75 4B K 107 6B k 
44 2C , 76 4C L 108 6C l 
45 2D - 77 4D M 109 6D m 
46 2E . 78 4E N 110 6E n 
47 2F / 79 4F O 111 6F o 
48 30 0 80 50 P 112 70 p 
49 31 1 81 51 Q 113 71 q 
50 32 2 82 52 R 114 72 r 
51 33 3 83 53 S 115 73 s 
52 34 4 84 54 T 116 74 t 
53 35 5 85 55 U 117 75 u 
54 36 6 86 56 V 118 76 v 
55 37 7 87 57 W 119 77 w 




57 39 9 89 59 Y 121 79 y 
58 3A : 90 5A Z 122 7A z 
59 3B ; 91 5B [ 123 7B { 
60 3C <  92 5C \ 124 7C | 
61 3D = 93 5D ] 125 7D } 
62 3E >  94 5E ^ 126 7E ~ 
63 3F ? 95 5F _ 127 7F DEL  
 
• no loss of information 
If the conversions are performed from type short integer to long integer, or 
float, or double, or from float to double, no loss of information occurs. In 
other words, the conversion is seamless.  
• Loss of information 
Loss of information includes loss of precision, undefined value, and loss 
of magnitude. 
o Loss of precision 
If the conversions are performed from type float to long integer, or 
short integer, or from double to float, or long integer, or short 
integer, loss of precision may occur due to the truncation of the 
decimal fraction.  
According to Standard IEEE 754, the single precision floating 
number (float) has 8 significant figures and can be expressed as: 
1 2 3 8( 1) . ... 10
s ef m m m m= − × ×  
Where 




 e is the exponent, 
 m1, m2, … ,m8 are the significant figures. 
When a data object of other types (such as long and double) with 
more than 8 significant figures is converted to type float, some 
precision is lost. Similar to the float number expression, we 
express the data as: 
1 2 3( 1) . ... 10
s e
Nd m m m m= − × ×  
Where  
N is the number of significant figures of the data. 
Then the relative error due to conversion is: 
1 2 3 1 2 3 8
1 2 3
79 10
1 2 3 1 2 3
( 1) . ... 10 ( 1) . ... 10 
( 1) . ... 10
0.0000000 ... 0.0000001 10
. ... . ...
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When the data type is converted from a single precision floating 
point number to an integer, the floating point number is truncated 
at the decimal point, and the maximum absolute error is 1. 
o Undefined value 
When the conversions are performed from float to long integer or 
short integer; or from double to long integer or short integer, if the 




results are different in different languages. For instance, in C++ 
and PHP, the result is a numeric value which has no relation with 
the initial value, while in JAVA, the result is the maximum 
number which can be represented by the destination type. More 
precisely, in JAVA, when converting a single precision floating 
point number to an integer, if the floating point number is greater 
than 2147483647, then the conversion result will be 2147483647. 
If the float pointing number is less than -2147483648, then the 
conversion result will be always -2147483648. 
o Loss of Magnitude 
When the conversions are performed from long integer to short 
integer, only the lower-order word is preserved. The higher-order 
word is truncated. The long integer can be expressed in base 2 as: 
( )31 30 0 2......l b b b=  
After the conversion, the short integer is: 
( )15 14 0 2......s b b b=  
Then the relative error is: 
( ) ( )
( )




30 29 0 14 13 02 2
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30 29 0 2







b b b b b bl s
l b b b
b b b b b b
b b b










( ) ( )
( ) ( )
31 15
30 29 0 14 13 02 2
31 15
30 29 0 14 13 02 2
( 1) ...... ( 1) ......
...... ...... (2 1) (2 1)
2147516414
b bl s b b b b b b
b b b b b b
− = − × − − ×
≤ + ≤ − + −
=
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
31 15
30 29 0 14 13 02 2
30 29 0 14 13 0 30 29 152 2 2
( 1) ...... ( 1) ......
...... ...... ...... 00000000000000
b bl s b b b b b b
b b b b b b b b b
− = − × − − ×
≥ − =
 
The result of conversion is shown in Figure 5-7. 
 
Figure 5-7 Result of Conversion 
5.1.4 Summary 
Based on the discussion above, the possible results for different conversions 
are shown in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4 Results for different conversions 
Source Type Destination Type Conversion 
Char Short Integer meaningless type change 
Char Long Integer meaningless type change 
Char Float meaningless type change 
Char Double meaningless type change 




Short Integer Float No information loss 
Short Integer Double No information loss 
Short Integer Char meaningless type change 
Long Integer Float Loss of precision 
Long Integer Double Loss of precision 
Long Integer Char meaningless type change 
Long Integer Short Integer Loss of magnitude 
Float Double No information loss. 
Float Char meaningless type change 
Float Short Integer Loss of precision; undefined value; Loss of 
magnitude 
Float Long Integer Loss of precision; undefined value; Loss of 
magnitude 
Double Char meaningless type change 
Double Short Integer loss of precision; undefined value; Loss of 
magnitude 
Double Long Integer Loss of precision; undefined value 
Double Float Loss of precision; undefined value 
As discussed in the above sections, the propagation of incorrect type failure 
can be summarized as shown in Figure 5-8. Now, the propagation probability of 





Figure 5-8 Propagation of Incorrect Type 
5.2 Range Failure 
5.2.1 Definition 
The range defines the values a quantity may take. In [2, 3], it is formally 
defined as: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )min ,maxRg I V I V I⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦  
V(I) represents the value of the input. 
One must note that the range may consist of only one region, e.g., Rg=[0,100], 
or it may consist of several regions, e.g., Rg=[0,13]∪ [50,79] ∪ [91,100]. For the 
sake of simplicity, we will use ( )( ) ( )( )min ,maxV I V I⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  to represent the range 




5.2.2 Out of Range Failure 
The possible failure mode is “out of range”, i.e., ( ) ( )eV I Rg I∉ . For 
example, if the expected range is ( ) [ ]0,100Rg I =  and the input value is 110, then an 
out of range failure occurs. As a special case of value failure, the out of range value is 
assigned to its variable directly and causes a data state error. 
Essentially, the computer’s memory is made up of bytes. Each byte has a 
number and an address associated with it. As soon as a variable is declared, the 
amount of memory needed is assigned for it at a specific location in memory (its 
memory address). For example, as shown in Figure 5-9, an integer variable has a 





Figure 5-9 Variable and its address 
 
Although we generally do not actively decide the exact location of the 
variable and just operate on the value of the variable, in some cases we may be 
interested in knowing the address where our variable is being stored during runtime in 
order to perform some operations related with the positions.  
The variables can be divided into two categories: address-related and non 
address-related. The failures in the address-related variables are critical for the system. 




immediately if those faults are activated. The pointer faults they used in their 
experiment are the same as the address-related failures introduced in this dissertation. 
It is easy to explain their experimental results. If the address value is not 
correct, the computer will access a different memory address. The wrong memory 
address may be prohibited for accessing. For example, the attempt to read data from 
an array, A(10) (its range is [ ]0,9 ), by using A[-1] will be reported as an error.  
The system will likely crash even when the action is allowed to happen. If the 
software performs a write action on the wrong address, it will change the value at that 
address instead of the expected address. Hence, it may cause a value failure to the 
software because the value at the expected address is not updated as expected. At the 
same time, updating a value at a wrong address will cause some unpredictable failure 
to other running applications or even to the operating system. If the value is used by 
another application, it may cause this application to fail. If the failure in other 
applications further impacts the operating system, the software component being 
studied will fail sooner or later due to the operating system failure. If the failures in 
other applications have no impact on the operating system, the software will not be 
affected. Because our target system includes only the operating system and the 
software under study and the failures in other applications do not impact our target 
system, so the failure can not be detected in our system. 
If the value is used by the operating system, it may cause a crash of the 
operating system. Although it is possible that the write action does not affect the 
operating system, the probability is very small. So, we would rather claim that the 




If the software just performs a read action on the wrong address (if it could), it 
may read incorrect values and the out of range failure is transformed to the value 
failure. Then, its propagation criterion can be therefore expressed as ( ) ( )t te ff I f I≠ . 
If the out of range value is non address-related, it will just impact the value of 
the variable. The out of range value may be replaced by a boundary value. For 
example, if the input to an integer is greater than 2147483647, then the number 
2147483647 may be assigned to the variable. Let us denote by IbL and IbU the values 
of the lower and upper bound of the expected range respectively. Then the 
propagation criterion for this case can be expressed as: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
,  if 
,  if 
t t
e bL f bL
t t
e bU f bU
f I f I I I





(Eq  5-1) 
The out-of-range value may be out of the range that the computer can 
represent (physical range) when the out-of-range value is not automatically adjusted. 
This may cause an undefined value and probably cause a crash of the software. If the 
out-of-range value does not exceed the physical range, it will cause a value failure 
and the propagation criterion is the same as the value failure, i.e., ( ) ( )t te ff I f I≠ . 
By summarizing the discussion above, the propagation of the out-of-range 
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Figure 5-10 Propagation of Out of Range Failure 
5.3 Amount Failure 
5.3.1 Definition 
The amount is the total number or quantity of input, denoted by A(I). A(I) is 
defined as: ( )A I I= ,  where “ I ” yields  the number of elements in the vector I. 
The possible failure modes are “too much” and “too little” amount of input. 
They are defined as: 
Too much: ( )A I υ>  
Too little: ( )A I υ<  
Where 




For example, in PACS, the user is expected to provide the SSN of an entrant 
and his/her Last Name at the same time. Then the amount of input is 
, 2SSN LastName = . If the user only provides SSN or LastName, then a too little 
amount of input failure occurs. On the other hand, if the user provides SSN, 
LastName and PIN, then a too much amount of input failure occurs. 
5.3.2 Propagation of Amount Failure 
Let us denote the n-element-input by { }1 2, ,......, nI v v v= . The too little amount 
failure means that a sub-set of the elements is missing. The elements in an input 
vector may come from different components or they may come from the same 
component. 
For the too little amount failure, without losing generality, let us assume that 
the actual amount is n', 'n n< ; and the ith element is missing. If the elements come 
from different components, which means some or all of the components fail to send 
information to the software component, the absence will cause a “too late” failure 
which will be described in 6.2.3. 
If the elements come from the same component, missing an element will 
create a shift in the position of the elements following it. The shift will cause value-
related failures to the elements 1, ,...,  and i i nv v v+ . The actual input can be expressed as 
{ },1 ,2 , 1 , , 1, ,, ,..., , , ......,e e e i f i f i f nI v v v v v v− += . From the expression, we can see that the first 
i-1 elements are the same as the expected ones while the remaining elements may be 
different from their expected values. Because the elements vi, vi+1, …, and vn may 




For instance, if the type of vf,i is different from the type of ve,i, a type failure occurs. 
Furthermore, some elements, vn, vn-1, etc., may be assigned to an empty value, that 
makes it appear like the elements have not been provided. For instance, if the length 
of vi is equal to or larger than the summation of the length of the remaining elements, 
the remaining elements will be treated as element vi and there are no inputs provided 
to the remaining elements. Then, it seems that the remaining elements are missing. 
The propagation analysis for the omitted failure is described in section 6.2.3. This is a 
case where multiple omissions may occur. Denote the failure in the element by 
, , , 1,...,f jv j i i n= + . The propagation criterion for this situation can be expressed as: 
{ }( ) { }( ),1 ,2 , ,1 , 1 , , 1 ,, ,..., ,..., , , ,...,e e e n e e i f i f i f nf v v v f v v v v v− +≠  (Eq.  5-2) 
The propagation of “too little” amount failure can be described as Figure 5-11. 
{ }( ) { }( ),1 ,2 , ,1 , 1 , , 1 ,, ,..., ,..., , , ,...,e e e n e e i f i f i f nf v v v f v v v v v− +≠
 
Figure 5-11 Propagation of Too Little Amount Failure 
 
The too much amount failure means that one or some additional elements are 
provided along with the n required elements, i.e., { }1 2 1, ,..., , ,..., ,  1n n n kI v v v v v k+ += ≥ . 
The propagation behavior depends on how these additional elements are handled.  
If the elements come from different components, the additional elements are 
not accepted, because the software only gets inputs from the expected components. 




When the elements come from the same component, if the elements are 
provided and read in fixed formats and the additional elements are provided after the 
n expected elements, the n elements will be read correctly and no additional elements 
are read. Hence, the too much amount failure does not propagate. For example, if the 
software reads one character for each element, then only n characters are read for the 
n expected elements. If the additional elements are stored in a buffer, it will be used 
as next input and may cause an input failure to next input. If the additional elements 
are inserted in the middle of the n expected elements (assume that they are inserted 
after the ith expected element without losing generality), it may cause other value-
related (value, type or range) failure to the remaining expected elements. If the type 
of the type of the additional element is different with the type of the expected element, 
a type failure occurs. If the value of the additional element is different with the value 
of the expected element, a value failure occurs. If the value exceeds the range of the 
expected range or physical range, a range failure occurs. 
If the software does not read the elements in fixed formats, the additional 
elements will be treated as part of the nth element and cause a value-related (value or 
range) failure to it. If the additional elements are inserted in the middle of the n 
expected elements, it may cause other value-related failure to the elements as 
discussed in the above. Then, the propagation of the too much amount of input failure 









6 Propagation of Time-Related Failure Modes 
 
6.1 Time-Related Failure Modes 
Time plays a critical role in many modern software systems, especially in 
real-time systems. Time-related failure modes cover the characteristics of the input 
such as time, rate, and duration. In the following section, the propagations of these 
failure modes are discussed.  
6.2 Timing Failure 
6.2.1 Definition 
The software input usually functions within a time window [ ],a bt t . We 
assume that both software and system requirements share the same time window 
specifications. Some software systems are sensitive to the length of the time window. 
If the input arrives before the time window (i.e., at t< ) a premature (too early) failure 
occurs. If the information is provided after the time window (i.e., bt t> ) a delayed 
(too late) failure occurs. If the input arrival time t goes to infinite, an omitted failure 
mode occurs. Obviously, the omitted failure mode is a special case of delayed failure 





Figure 6-1 Time Window for Input 
6.2.2 Computational Model 
To analyze the behavior of timing failures, the software can be modeled as the 
combination of (i) a data processing unit, (ii) an input buffer (of size n) and (iii) a 
time window (of duration d) that appears repeatedly (i times) during the software 
operation with a separation s between two consecutive time windows. This is 
illustrated in Figure 6-2. Input data is accepted only while a time window is activated. 
Only one input (which may consist of a complex set of values) is accepted per time 
window. If the input data arrives out of a time window and the buffer size n is equal 
to 0 (i.e., the buffer is full or there is no buffer) the input data will be lost. Otherwise, 
if n is greater than zero, the input will be stored in the buffer and accepted when the 
next window is activated. Note that by varying the specifications of n, d, i and s, the 
proposed model can cover all the different ways a software system deals with input 
data.  
The propagation of timing failures depends on whether or not the data 
processing unit implements fault tolerance strategies (i.e., error detection and 
recovery mechanisms) that can deal with the error. Accordingly, three possible 
























Figure 6-2 Computational Model for timing failure 
 
Case 1. No fault tolerance mechanism is available. The timing failure thus 
propagates to the output (e.g., in an image processing software, a missing data packet 
will lead to a pixel not being displayed on a screen).  
Case 2. Error detection mechanisms (e.g., a watchdog timer) exist and 
implement safety strategies, such as stopping or crashing the software system.  
Case 3. The data processing unit provides error recovery mechanisms (with or 
without associated detection mechanisms) that can handle the situation (e.g., an 
exception handler that triggers a forward recovery action). In this case, a recovery 
action may successfully mask the timing failure.  
In the following sections, the propagation of the too late, omitted, and too 





6.2.3 Too Late (and Omitted) Failure Mode 
The too late failure (also called delayed failure, timeout failure or deadline 
missed) occurs when the input data arrives after its corresponding time window. The 
three possible reactions of the data processing unit to this situation are: 
Case 1. No fault-tolerance mechanisms available. In this case, the timeout 
failure does not affect the data state directly. Instead, it only affects the time needed 
to generate the output, i.e., the output is delayed or omitted. Since the data state is not 
infected, the Image Reconstruction Method is not applicable. Note that the delayed or 
omitted software output may not be considered a failure from the system viewpoint if 
the system requirements tolerate the occurrence of software delays (e.g., as is the case 
for soft real-time systems). The propagation criterion from the system viewpoint can 
be expressed as follows: 
limit
oao ttt >+= τ   
where: 
ot is the time at which the output is generated, 
it  is the time at which the input arrives (which can be ∞ in case the input is omitted), 
τ is the minimum execution time required to produce an output, 
limit
ot  is the time limit specified at system level before which the software output 
should be provided. 
Case 2. Error-detection mechanisms available. The error-detection 
mechanisms (e.g., exception handlers, watchdog timers, etc.) provided by the 
software may detect the timing failure and signal it. Usually, such a detection is 




consider this situation as a kind of fault propagation. Hence, we assume the 
propagation probability is 1 when the timing failure is detected. This case is covered 
by the Image Reconstruction Method since the missing input can be represented by a 
NULL value (i.e., the void set). It is reasonable to do that since the data processing 
unit does not receive any data during the time window. The software output can also 
be defined as a NULL. This can be formally expressed as follows: 
( ) ( )ef NULL NULL f I= ≠ . 
When a timing failure is not detected by the error mechanisms, the situation is 
the same as the one described in Case 1 above.  
Case 3. Recovery mechanisms available. This case represents the situation in 
which the software provides recovery mechanisms that can mask the timing failure. 
For example, when a too-late failure occurs, the data processing unit may get some 
predefined data from memory and use it as an input to continue the computation. The 
predefined data may be a constant value or a dynamic value. 
If the predefined data is a constant value, c, the propagation criteria can be 
expressed as: 
( ) ( ) ( )e rf I f I f c= =  
Then, only the PMA that maps to ( )f c  is required to calculate the fault 
propagation probability. The Image Reconstruction Method presented in 4.4.2 can be 





Figure 6-3 Simplified Algorithm 
 
Once the PMA is identified, the propagation probability for the timeout failure 
can be estimated using (Eq.  4-1). 
On the other hand, the predefined data may not be a fixed value, but rather a 
dynamic value stored in memory that is periodically updated by the software system. 
Let m represent the dynamic data stored in memory. Then, for any given m, the 
probability that the fault is masked corresponds to the probability that the output 
related to the expected input, eI , is equal to the output related to the predefined data 
m. In general, the propagation probability for all possible predefined data can be 
expressed as: 
 
1. Divide the input domain, [Imin, Imax] into N sub-intervals with N+1 
interpolation points: 
 {Ii, i=0, 1, 2, …, N and Imin =I0 <I1 <I2< … < IN = Imax}. 
2. Calculate function f using the interpolation points. If two consecutive 
interpolation points, Ii and Ii+1, generate the same output and such an 
output is equal to f(c) (i.e., f(Ii) = f(Ii+1) = f(c)) then randomly select 
one or more points from sub-interval [Ii, Ii+1]. If these latter points are 
equal to f(c), then [Ii, Ii+1] can be considered as one flat part which 
can potentially mask the too late failure. 
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(Eq  6-1) 
 
where: 
( )p m  represents the probability density function of value m, 
[ ]( ) ( )ep f I f m= represents the probability that the output related to the expected 
input is equal to the output generated by value m. 
 
In practice, the propagation probability for predefined data can be calculated 
by combining the algorithm in Figure 6-3 and a numerical integration method. The 
corresponding algorithm is shown in  
Figure 6-4.  
Probability ( )pp i  in step 6 represents the contribution of the ith interval 
[ ]1,i im m−  from the probability density function ( )p m  to the propagation probability 
of value im . Since value m may vary, the average value 
( ) ( )1
2
i ip m p m− +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ is used to 
represent the probability density in such an interval. 






Figure 6-4 Algorithm to Calculate Probability for predefined data 
 
Figure 6-5 Propagation of Delayed Failure Mode 
1. Determine the range of predefined data m, R(m), and its probability 
density function, p(m). Values m and p(m) can be obtained from the 
software operational profile. 
2. Divide R(m) into k sub-intervals with k+1 interpolation points:  
 {mi, i=0, 1, 2, ..., k and mmin = m0 < m1 <m2 < ... < mk = mmax.} 
3. Set i=1. 
4. Use the algorithm in Figure 6-3 to identify the PMA that maps to f(mi). 
5. Using (Eq  6-1), calculate the propagation probability for value mi, pp(mi). 
6. Calculate 2/)]()()[()( 1 iii mpmpmppipp += − . 
7. Increase i by 1. 
8. Repeat steps 4 ~ 6 until i is greater than k. 











6.2.4 Too Early Failure Mode 
Too-early (or premature) failures occur when the input arrives before the time 
window. The three possible reactions of the data processing unit to this situation are: 
Case 1. No fault tolerance mechanisms available. If the input arrives before 
the time window and the software is not ready to receive it (i.e., the available buffer 
size is 0), the input will be lost and no output will be generated. In this case, the too 
early failure is propagated. As described in the Case 1 in section 6.2.3, the omitted 
software output may not be considered a failure from the system viewpoint if the 
system requirements tolerate software delays. 
On the other hand, if the software accepts the input (i.e., the early input is 
initially stored in the buffer and used at the beginning of the time window) a correct 
output will be produced, both in the value and time domains. In this case, the 
propagation probability is 0. This situation can also be seen as a masking of the 
failure due to the intrinsic fault tolerance properties of the software algorithm.  
Case 2. Error detection mechanisms available. This situation is similar to 
Case 2 of Section 6.2.3.  
Case 3. Recovery mechanisms available. In this case, several types of 
recovery mechanisms might mask the too early failure. For example, an explicit 
recovery mechanism (similar to a buffer) could be implemented that allows for 
storing the early input and using it when the time window is activated. This situation 
is similar to Case 1 described above. The propagation probability will thus depend on 




6.3 Rate Failure 
6.3.1 Definition 
Rate of the input is the frequency at which the input is received. It is formally 
defined in [1, 2] as: 
( ) ( ) ( )i j m i j i
mR I





Tj is the time of jth occurrence of Ii, 
Tj+m is the time of (j+m)th occurrence of Ii, 
m is the number of occurrences of Ii between Tj and Tj+m. 
Two necessary conditions are required to guarantee that the rate is one of the 
characteristics of the input to the software component. 
1) The inputs are sent to the same receiver in the software component. More 
precisely, the same variable is sent to the I/O portion of the software 
component. The concept of rate is meaningless when inputs address different 
variables.  
2) The input appears periodically.   
Normally, there exists a range for the rate:[ , ]L Uυ υ , where Uυ  is the expected 
upper bound of the rate and Lυ  is the expected lower bound of the rate. Therefore, the 
"too fast" and "too slow" rate failure modes can be defined as: 
Too fast:, ( )i UR I υ>  




Figure 6-6 illustrates too fast and too slow failure modes.  
 
Figure 6-6 Too Fast and Too Slow Failure Modes 
6.3.2 Floors and Ceilings 
For any real number a, we denote the greatest integer less than or equal to "a" 
by a⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (read "the floor of a"), and denote the smallest integer greater than or equal to 
"a" by a⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥  (read "the ceiling of a"). For any real number "a," 
1 1a a a a a− < ≤ ≤ < +⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥ . 
6.3.3 Propagation Criteria 
To determine if the input failure propagates to the software output, one should 
consider the inequality ( ) ( )t tf ef I f I≠ . The inputs are expected to appear periodically 
with rate ve (as shown in Figure 6-7). Then at the time ,  0,1,2......et kT k= = , we 
should check if the output is the same as the expected output ( ( )ekTef I ), i.e., 
( ) ( ),   1/  and 0,1, 2......e ekT kTf e e ef I f I T kυ≠ = =  The too fast/slow input rate failure may 
cause a too fast/slow output rate, so another propagation criterion for the rate failure 




( ) ( )f eR O R O≠ . Then the propagation criteria for the too fast input rate can be 
summarized as: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ),   1/  and 0,1,2......e ekT kTf e e e
f e
f I f I T k
or
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Figure 6-7 Input and Output Series 
 
6.3.4 Too Fast Rate Failure 
To study the propagation of the too fast input rate failure, we consider the 
following modes in which the rate failure may occur. 
6.3.4.1 Sporadic Mode 
In the sporadic mode, the software is triggered by an environment that is not 
periodic. An environmental trigger can be an interruption, an event, or other signals 
representing the occurrence of special condition. For instance, in a temperature 
monitoring system, when the temperature is higher than a critical threshold, a sensor 
will trigger the software’s execution. In some credit card antitheft systems, when the 
fee of one single transaction is charged more than the limit set by the users, an alert 




periodically, the rate failure is not applicable to these situations. These situations are 
handled under the timing failure category. 
 
6.3.4.2 Passive Mode 
The set of situations occurred in the passive mode are identical to the sporadic 
mode except that the environment is periodic, i.e., the signals occur regularly. As 
shown in Figure 6-8, the interruptions arise with a period T. Once the input is ready in 
the environment, the software will be triggered by the interruption. The input is sent 
to the software along with the interruption or the software reads the input from a 
defined location. When the trigger rate is too fast for the software to handle all the 
interruptions within the time available, a too fast failure occurs.  
SW Execution SW Execution SW Execution SW Execution
τ







Enable IRQ DisableIRQ DisableIRQ DisableIRQ DisableIRQ Enable
 
Figure 6-8 Interruption System 
 
In the interruption system, when an interruption is being handled, the software 
will not be interrupted by other interruptions with equal or lower priorities. Because 
all the inputs have the same priority (they are the same type of input), when software 
is handling previous interruption, the interruption request (IRQ) is disabled. Only 





This behavior is common in event-driven software. When an event is being 
handled, the new incoming events will be stored in an event task buffer. Once the 
software completes its current task, it picks up the next event in the buffer. When the 
buffer is full, no more event requests can be stored into the buffer. New incoming 
inputs will then be dropped. 
In these systems, the software requires a minimum amount of time, denoted as 
τ, to execute each event request. When the actual input rate is faster than the expected 
maximum rate, 1eυ τ
= , a too fast input rate failure occurs. Because the event 
requesting rate is faster than the maximum rate, whenever the software finishes one 
task, it starts to handle next request. The output rate is therefore the same as its 
maximum output rate, i.e., ( ) ( )1f eR O R Iτ= ≠ .  
In the following discussion, the buffer size is denoted as n (n≥0); the actual 
input rate is denoted as ,  f e fυ υ υ< . 
Since the actual input rate is faster than the expected one, the buffer will be 
filled by the event requests sooner or later. Once the buffer is full, a new incoming 
event request will not be accepted. We denote the first time, at which an event request 
is lost, as tl. To obtain tl, we could assume the buffer size is n+1 instead of n. Then, 
the time at which an event request is stored in the n+1 position of the buffer is tl. It 
can be obtained by solving the equations:  
1
,  1, 2,3,......
f l e l
l
l l f l
f
n t t
mt m T m
υ υ
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f ltυ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  is the number of total inputs arrived by time tl, 
e ltυ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  is the number of inputs  which have already taken by the software by time tl. 
Hence, the first lost input occurs at time l fm T , at which the ( 1)
th
lm +  event 
request arises. The first lm  event requests are accepted by the software, in order, 
without missing any input. All the event requests can be handled by the software. The 
event request handled by software at time kτ is the actual event request stored in the 
buffer at time kTf, i.e., fe
kTkT
e fI I= . Then the propagation criterion can be expressed as: 
( ) ( ),  0,1,2..., ( 1)fkT kf e lf I f I k m
τ≠ = −  
(Eq.  6-3) 
In these event driven systems, the information contained in the event requests 
does not change due to the too fast rate failure, i.e., fkTke fI I
τ =  and therefore 
( ) ( )fkT kf ef I f I
τ= .  That means the too fast rate failure is therefore not detected before 
the thlm  event request. 
After l ft T− , the buffer is full. The new incoming event requests will not be 
accepted unless the software has taken one event request out and there is one vacancy 
available. Hence, the (k+1)th ( lk m> ) event request with index k accepted by the 
software is not exactly the (k+1)th actual event request. Instead, it is the (p+1)th (p>k) 
actual event request with index p. If an input is stored into the buffer, it will be read 
by the software sooner or later. Hence, the order in which an input is stored into the 
buffer is the order it will be read by the software. As shown in Figure 6-9, in the 




in the period ( 1) ,l f fm T pT⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦ . In this period, only when an input is taken by the 
software, can an incoming input be accepted by the buffer. Assume p is such an input 
that would be stored into the buffer. In the period ( 1) ,l f fm T pT⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦ , the number of 
the inputs read by the software from the buffer is ( )1f e l f epT m Tυ υ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . That 
means there are ( )1f e l f epT m Tυ υ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  inputs (including p itself) are stored into 
the buffer in this period. Then the corresponding index k can be expressed as: 
( ) ( )( )1 1 ,  l f e l f e lk m pT m T k mυ υ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= − + − − ≥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (Eq.  6-4) 
The propagation criteria after the ml input can be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( )
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⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= − + − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
(Eq.  6-5) 
 
 
Figure 6-9 Dropped Inputs in Too Fast Rate Failure 
 
An example is shown in Figure 6-10. In this example, the buffer size is 1; the 







Figure 6-10 Too Fast Rate Failure in an Event Driven System (ve=2, vf=3, n=1) 
 
In the above discussion, we assume that when an input (event request) arrives 
at the same moment at which the software just completes handling one event request 
and starts to handle next event request in the buffer, the event request can be stored 
into the buffer. For instance, at 3 ft T=  in Figure 6-11, the buffer is full. The software 
is finishing ER1 and starts handling ER2 so that there is one vacancy in the buffer and 
ER3 can be stored into the buffer. 
The expected input rate in the above discussion is the same as the maximum 
physically affordable rate.  In most cases, the expected input rate is slower than the 
maximum physically affordable rate, i.e., 1eυ τ
< . In this case, when 1 f eυ υτ
> > , all 
the event requests are accepted by the buffer and then further handled by the 
software. Whenever the software finishes handling one event request, it will generate 




( ) ( ) ( )f f eR O R I R I= ≠ . The too fast failure is thus revealed (as shown in Figure 







Actual Input/Output Rate: Expected Input/Output Rate:
 
Figure 6-11 Too Fast Input Rate causes Too Fast Output Rate 
 
 
6.3.4.3 Active Mode  
In the active mode, the software periodically reads data from the environment. 
The period is controlled by a clock. In the passive mode, when the software is 
triggered, the input is already valid. In the active mode, when the software is 
triggered by a clock, an input may not be available. Because the software is triggered 
by its embedded clock, its output has the same rate as the clock rate. If the data in the 
environment is updated faster than the clock rate embedded in the software, a too fast 
rate failure occurs. Since the updating rate is faster than the reading rate, the input is 
ready every time the software reads the data. The propagation is related with the 
buffer size and its behavior. In the passive mode, the buffer will not accept any more 
inputs when it is full. However, in the active mode, the oldest input may be popped 
out of the buffer and the new incoming input is pushed into the buffer. In the active 




software reading rate (the expected input rate) no matter the environment updating 
rate is fast or slow, i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )e eR O R O R I= = . 
There is a special active mode called the polling system. In the polling system, 
the software is also active to read the data in every period. However, if the data is not 
ready, the software keeps checking until the data is ready or the current period ends. 
Once the data is ready, the software handles the data and provides corresponding 
output and then goes to a sleeping status. In the polling system, the output rate is not 
so significant as the previous two cases. As long as one and only input arrives in each 
period, the system functions correctly. In the following sections, we will analyze 
these different cases. 
6.3.4.3.1 Buffer Behavior 1 
When the buffer is full, no more new incoming inputs are accepted. Those 
inputs are dropped. Only when the software reads one input from the buffer and 
leaves one vacancy in the buffer, can a new incoming input be put into the buffer. 
Figure 6-12 shows how this kind of buffer behavior impacts the fault propagation. 
The detailed process is described in Table 6-1. 
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Table 6-1 Example for Too Fast Failure  (1) 
Time (sec) Behavior 
0.5 The first input arrives; the time window is not activated; the first input 
is sent to the buffer. 
1 The second input arrives; the time window is activated; the first input is 
read by DPU; the second input is sent to the buffer. 
1.5 The third input arrives; the time window is not activated; the third input 
is sent to the buffer; the buffer is full. 
2 The fourth input arrives; the time window is activated; the second input 
is read by DPU; the fourth input is sent to the buffer; the buffer is full. 
2.5 The fifth input arrives; the time window is not activated; the buffer is 
full; the fifth input is abandoned. 
3 The sixth input arrives; the time window is activated; the third input is 
read by DPU; the sixth input is sent to the buffer; the buffer is full. 
3.5 The seventh input arrives; the time window is not activated; the buffer 
is full; the seventh input is abandoned. 
4 The eighth input arrives; the time window is activated; the fourth input 
is read by DPU; the eighth input is sent to the buffer; the buffer is full. 
4.5 The ninth input arrives; the time window is not activated; the buffer is 
full; the ninth input is abandoned. 
5 The tenth input arrives; the time window is activated; the sixth input is 
read by DPU; the tenth input is sent to the buffer; the buffer is full. 
5.5 The eleventh input arrives; the time window is not activated; the buffer 
is full; the eleventh input is abandoned. 
6 The twelfth input arrives; the time window is activated; the eighth input 
is read by DPU; the twelfth input is sent to the buffer; the buffer is full. 
 
As shown in this example, the data received by DPU at time t is not actually 
generated at time t. Instead, the data is generated some time before it is read. For 
instance, the data received by DPU at 1 second is generated at 0.5 second; the data 
received by DPU at 2 second is generated at 1 second. Hence, it is too early failure 
for each individual input data. 
This case is mostly identical to the passive mode. The analysis in the passive 
mode is valid. However, because the data is updated by the environment, the data is 
time dependent. Then ekTeI  may be different with f
kT
fI . Hence, the propagation criteria 




( ) ( ) ( ),  0,1, 2..., 1f ekT kTf e lf I f I k m≠ = −  (Eq.  6-3) 
( ) ( )
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⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= − + − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
(Eq.  6-5) 
 
As the example shown in Figure 6-14, ml can be calculated as 8 through (Eq.  
6-2). Before the input "7", the software can handle the inputs correctly. Input "8" is 
the first dropped input. Input "9" can be stored into the buffer. Then, with (Eq.  6-4), 
one could get ( ) ( )1 18 1 9 3 8 1 3 8
5 5
k ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= − + × × − − × × =⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
. That means its index in 
the software accepted series is 8, which is consistent with the fact. 
6.3.4.3.2 Buffer Behavior 2 
When the buffer is full and a new input arrives, the oldest input stored in the 
buffer is popped out and the new incoming input is pushed into the buffer. An 
example for this buffer behavior is shown in Figure 6-13. The other conditions are the 
same as the example presented for the buffer behavior 1. The detailed process is 
described in Table 6-2. One can compare it with the previous example to show how 
different buffer behaviors impact the inputs received by the DPU. 
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Table 6-2 Example for Too Fast Failure (2) 
Time (sec) Behavior 
0.5 The first input arrives; the time window is not activated; the first input 
is sent to the buffer. 
1 The second input arrives; the time window is activated; the first input is 
read by DPU; the second input is sent to the buffer. 
1.5 The third input arrives; the time window is not activated; the third input 
is sent to the buffer; the buffer is full. 
2 The fourth input arrives; the time window is activated; the second input 
is read by DPU; the fourth input is sent to the buffer; the buffer is full. 
2.5 The fifth input arrives; the time window is not activated; the third input 
is pop out; the fifth input is sent to the buffer; the buffer is full. 
3 The sixth input arrives; the time window is activated; the fourth input is 
read by DPU; the sixth input is sent to the buffer. 
3.5 The seventh input arrives; the time window is not activated; the fifth 
input is pop out; the seventh input is sent to the buffer; the buffer is 
full. 
4 The eighth input arrives; the time window is activated; the sixth input is 
read by DPU; the eighth input is sent to the buffer; the buffer is full. 
4.5 The ninth input arrives; the time window is not activated; the seventh 
input is pop out; the ninth input is sent to the buffer; the buffer is full. 
5 The tenth input arrives; the time window is activated; the eighth input 
is read by DPU; the tenth input is sent to the buffer; the buffer is full. 
5.5 The eleventh input arrives; the time window is not activated; the ninth 
input is pop out; the eleventh input is sent to the buffer; the buffer is 
full. 
6 The twelfth input arrives; the time window is activated; the eighth input 
is read by DPU; the twelfth input is sent to the buffer; the buffer is full. 
 
Similar with buffer behavior 1, tl is also a key parameter. Before l ft T− , all the 
inputs can be stored into the buffer. After l ft T− ; when the new input arrives and the 
buffer is full, the oldest input is popped out to leave one vacancy for the new input. 
Before l ft T− , the software has already handled mr inputs from the buffer which is 
determined by: 
( ) ( 1)r e l f e l fm t T m Tυ υ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= − = −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  






Figure 6-14 Example for Active Mode (Buffer Behavior 1) 




Then the (k+1)th ( rk m> ) input read by the software is not exactly the (k+1)
th 
input in the actual input series. Instead, it is the (p+1)th input in the actual input series. 
When the software receives the (k+1)th ( rk m> ) input from the buffer at time kTe, 
some inputs have been already popped out. During the period [ ],r e em T kT  (as shown 
in Figure 6-15), if the buffer is full, the oldest inputs stored in the buffer is popped out 
to leave one vacancy for the new incoming input. Denote the number of the popped 
inputs in this period as Np. Then the relationship between k and p can be expressed 
as:  
( 1) ( 1) p pp k N p k N+ = + + ⇒ = +  (Eq  6-7) 
 
[ ) ( ], ,r e e r e em T kT m T kT
p a sN N N= −  (Eq  6-8) 
Where 
( ],r e em T kT
s rN k m= −  is the number of the inputs read by the software in the 
period  ( ,r e em T kT ⎤⎦ , 
[ ),r e em T kT
aN  is the number of the inputs arrive in the period ),r e em T kT⎡⎣ . 
 
 
Remember, we assume that when the buffer is read or written at the same 
moment, but the read action occurs ahead of the write action. Hence, ( ],r e em T kTsN  
indicates that the input read by the software at time r em T  is not counted. Similarly, 
[ ),r e em T kT
aN  indicates that the input arrives at time ekT  is not counted. We introduce a 
positive infinitesimal ε, i.e., 0 and 0ε ε> → , so that we could easily express 
[ ),r e em T kT
aN  as: 





Substitute ( ],r e em T kTsN  and  
[ ),r e em T kT
aN  into (Eq  6-7) and (Eq  6-8), we could get: 
[ ) ( ]
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
, ,r e e r e em T kT m T kT
p a s
f e f r e r
f f
r f e f r e r r
e e
p k N k N N
k kT m T k m
m kT m T m k m
υ ε υ ε
υ υ
υ ε υ ε ε ε
υ υ
= + = + −
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= + − − − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= + − − − = + − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
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⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
(Eq  6-10) 
 
 
Figure 6-15 Popped Inputs in the Too Fast Rate Failure 
 
Those equations can be proven visually in Figure 6-16. ml can be calculated as 
8 with (Eq.  6-2). Then 4rm = . The input read by the software at time 8Te is the input 






Figure 6-16 Example for Active Mode (Buffer Behavior 2) 




6.3.4.3.3 Polling System 
One special active mode is the polling system in which the software is set to 
perform tasks in one predefined period, T. At the beginning of every period, the 
software keeps checking if an input is valid. Once the input is valid, the software 
handles it and provides a corresponding output. In the remainder of the period, the 
software goes to a sleeping status in which it will not perform any action. The 
diagram for this case is shown in Figure 6-17.  
The interval between two consecutive inputs should be fixed so that "the rate 
of input" is meaningful. Once the actual input rate, vf, is faster than the maximum rate 
allowed, 1e T
υ = , a too fast failure occurs.  
 
Figure 6-17 Polling System 
 
If the execution time for one input and the time necessary to provide an output 





Figure 6-18 Simplified Polling System 
 
In the simplified polling system, only one input is accepted in each period and 
all the other inputs are not accepted when the software is processing the input or is 
sleeping. This can be represented in the computational model with a buffer size 
always equaling 0. In each period, the accepted input is the one which arrives first in 
that period. In the first period, the software handles the first arrival input. In the kth 
(k>1) period, the software may not exactly handle the kth arrival input. In the first k 
period [ )0, kT , the number of arrival inputs (not including the input arrives at kT) is 
( ) fkT ε υ⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦ . Here ε is a positive infinitesimal. Then, the index for of the first input 
accepted by the software in the (k+1)th period is ( ) 1fkT ε υ⎢ ⎥− +⎣ ⎦ .  
If fkTυ  is an integer, then 
( ) 1 1 1 1f f f f fkT kT kT kT kTε υ υ ε υ υ υ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤− + = − + = − + = =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥  
If fkTυ  is not an integer, then 






ε υ υ ε υ ε
υ υ
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− + = − + = + +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤= + =⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥
 
Hence, in the (k+1)th period, the index of the first input accepted by the 




If the input rate is the expected input rate, then in the (k+1)th period, the index 
of the input should be (k+1). Hence, the propagation criterion can be expressed as: 
( 1)( ) ( ),  1, 2,3......f f ek T T k Tf ef I f I k
υ⎡ ⎤ +⎢ ⎥ ≠ =  
(Eq  6-11) 
 
When the software execution time and the time to provide output can not be 
ignored, the analysis is more complex. The end of a period is the deadline for 
completely providing the output. The deadline to receive the input is e pT τ τ− − , 
where τe and τp are the software execution time and the time to provide the output 
respectively. The too fast failure may cause the software to receive the first input after 
the deadline in some periods. Hence, the propagation criteria could be expanded to: 
( 1)( ) ( )
( ( 1) )
1, 2,3......
f f e
k T T kT
f e
f f e p
f I f I
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⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥ ≠
⎡ ⎤− − < − −⎢ ⎥
=
 
(Eq  6-12) 
6.3.5 Too Slow Failure Mode 
When the actual rate is slower than the expected rate, a too slow failure occurs 
(as shown in Figure 6-19). From a microcosmical viewpoint, every single input is later 
than its expected arrival time. 
 
 





6.3.5.1 Passive Mode 
Because the rate is slower than the expected rate, all the inputs in the "too 
slow failure mode" will be handled by the system. However, the system will generate 
an output series with a slow rate. Macrocosmically, the output is stretched along the 
time dimension (as shown in Figure 6-20). At time ,  0,1, 2,......et kT k= = , the input 
should be Ik. However, with the too slow input rate, at time ,  1, 2,......et kT k= = , the 












In the passive mode, when and only when an input arrives, the software can 
perform a corresponding action. Then the output rate is the same as the too slow input 
rate, i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )f f eR O R I R I= ≠ . Therefore, the propagation probability for this 
case is 1.  
 




6.3.5.2 Active Mode 
Since the actual updating rate is slower than the expected rate, whenever the 
software reads data from the environment, the data may not be ready or it is outdated 
and does not reflect current environment status. For instance, in a temperature 
monitoring system, when the sensor’s updating rate is slower than the expected rate, 
the software will not be able to read data that it is as new as possible (as shown in 
Figure 6-21). At time t, where / , 0,1, 2......e et kT k kυ= = = , the data has been updated 





⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . Hence, the criterion failure is propagation 
to the software output can be expressed as: 









≠ = = =  
(Eq  6-13) 
Result from the expected rate Result from the too slow rate Field Data
 
Figure 6-21 Too Slow Failure in the Temperature Monitoring System 
In some cases, if the data is not ready when the software tries to read it, the 
software may use a predefined value for processing. As we discussed in the timing 
failure, the predefined value could be a constant or a dynamic value. Actually, in the 
above temperature monitoring system, the software does not care if the data is ready. 




If the software uses a constant when the data is not ready, then the propagation 
criteria can be expressed as: 
( ) ( )
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(Eq  6-14) 
 
No matter the software uses constant or dynamic value, it always has data to 
process. Hence, the output rate is the same as the software reading rate which is the 
expected output rate, i.e., ( ) ( )f eR O R O= . 
 
6.3.5.3 Polling System 
When the input rate is slower than 1/T, a too slow failure occurs. If in one 
period, there is no input due to the too slow input rate, a failure will be detected. Let 
us assume the input "k" is the first input from which the too slow input rate failure 
starts to be detected (as shown in Figure 6-22). Then between this input and its 












Where ,  k N p N+∈ ∈  
Because "k" is the first input from which the too slow input rate failure starts 
to be detected, the first k inputs (0, 1, 2, ……, k-1) distribute in the  first k periods. 
One input falls in one period. That implies: p=k. Replace p with k in the above 
inequalities, one could get: 
,  fe
f e f e
TT k k N








Thus, before (k+1)th input, the too slow input rate failure can not be detected 
in the polling system. When the input rate is slower than 1/T, it is impossible that two 
consecutive inputs arrive in the same period. Then without considering the deadline 
for the inputs, the software will provide the output in the same rate as the input rate, 
i.e., ( ) ( )f fR O R I= . 
 
Figure 6-22 Too Slow Failure in Polling System 
6.3.6 Summary 
The propagation behaviors of the too fast and too slow rate failure are 
summarized in Table 6-4 and Table 6-3 respectively.  
 
Table 6-3 Summary for the propagation of too slow failure 
Mode Description of Propagation Behavior 
Passive Mode The too slow input rate causes a too slow output 
rate. The output rate is the same as the input rate. 
The propagation probability is 1. 
Dynamical value The propagation depends on (Eq  6-13). The 
output rate is the same as the software reading 
rate. 
Constant The propagation depends on (Eq  6-14). The 





Polling System The too slow input rate causes a too slow output 






Table 6-4 Summary for the propagation of too fast rate failure 
Mode Description of Propagation Behavior 
The input rate is faster than 
the maximum physical rate, 
1
τ
, which the software can 
handle. 
The too fast input rate failure is not detected 
before the first ml inputs are handled. After that, 






The input rate is slower than 
1
τ
, but faster than the 
expected rate. 
The too fast input rate causes a too fast output 
rate. The output rate is the same as the input rate. 
The propagation probability is 1. 
The new incoming inputs 
will be dropped if the buffer 
is full. 
For the first ml inputs, the propagation depends 
on the (Eq.  6-3), for the remaining inputs, the 
propagation depends on the (Eq.  6-5). The output 
rate is the same as the expected rate. 
If the buffer is full, the 
oldest input in the buffer is 
popped out and the new 
incoming input is pushed 
into the buffer. 
For the first mr inputs, the propagation depends 
on the (Eq.  6-3), for the remaining inputs, the 
propagation depends on the (Eq  6-10). The output 




Polling System with period 
T 
The too fast input rate failure is not detected in 
the first period. From the second period, the 
propagation depends on the (Eq  6-12).  
6.4 Duration Failure 
6.4.1 Definition 
The duration is the time period during which the input lasts. In [2, 3], duration 
is formally defined as: 
( )= the amount of time during which the input, I, is definedD I . 
6.4.2 Too short failure & too long failure 
When the duration of an input is shorter than the lower bound of the expected 
input duration, τ, ( ( )D I τ< ), a "too short duration failure" occurs (as shown in 




expected input duration, σ, ( ( )D I σ> ), a "too long duration" failure occurs (as 
shown in Figure 6-23b). The initiator of a duration failure may be a hardware 
component, software component, or a human being. 
 
 
Figure 6-23 Duration Failure 
6.4.3 Role of the Duration 
The role of the duration characteristic in the software environment should be 
studied before analyzing how a duration failure propagates. Normally, the duration of 
an input may be used in two modes: 
1. The measure of the duration is used as the value of a variable defined 
later in the software. For instance, the exposure duration is one of the 
parameters used in calculating radiation dose. When the duration is used as 
one of the input parameters, it must be measured by the software. According 
to the definition of data state in section 4.1, the too short /long duration failure 
causes an incorrect data state error directly. 
2. The duration acts as a means of identifying the presence of an input. 
For instance, in an interrupt system, the trigger duration must be longer than a 




duration is used as the means to recognize the existence of an input. The too 
short and too long failure will affect directly the input identification.  
In the following sections, we discuss the propagation of the duration failure in 
these two modes. 
6.4.3.1 Too Short Duration Failure 
If the duration is used in mode 1, let us denote by dval  the variable related 
with the measurement of the duration. Then the "too short duration" causes a smaller 
measurement value, i.e., , ,d f d eval val< , where ,d fval  and ,d eval  represent the values 
of the too short duration and the expected duration. Hence the propagation of the "too 
short duration" depends on the propagation of the incorrect value, dval : 
( ) ( ), , , ,,  d f d e d f d ef val f val val val≠ <  (Eq.  6-16) 
 
If the duration is used in mode 2, the input with too short duration will not be 
identified by the software. For example, when providing an input from the keyboard, 
if the keystroke action is too quick (the duration of the input is too short), the input 
will not be detected. Another example is the impulse counter. To avoid miscounting 
false signals, a threshold is often set for the pulse duration. If the duration of an input 
is shorter than the threshold of the pulse duration τ, i.e., ( )D I τ< , a too short 
duration failure occurs and the input is not counted. Hence, an input with too short 
pulse duration will be missed. Since the input is not detected, it seems that an 
omission failure occurs or in other words, the too short duration failure is transformed 




Based on the above analysis, one can summarize the propagation of the too 
short duration failure as shown in Figure 6-24. 
( ) ( ), , , ,, d f d e d f d ef val f val val val≠ <
 
Figure 6-24 Propagation of the “Too Short” Duration Failure 
 
6.4.3.2 Too Long Duration Failure 
If the duration is used in mode 1, the "too long duration failure" causes a 
larger measurement value, i.e., , ,d f d eval val> . The larger value may exceed the range 
of the expected value. If the value is not out of range, the propagation can be 
expressed as: 
( ) ( ), , , ,,  d f d e d f d ef val f val val val≠ >  (Eq.  6-17) 
If the value is out of range, because the value is non-address-related, the value 
may or may not be adjusted as described in 5.2.2.  
If the duration is used in mode 2, the too long duration may lead to the 
occurrence of multiple inputs (as shown in Figure 6-25). For instance, if key "a" is 
pressed too long, the software may regard the input as several inputs "a". The number 
of redundant inputs is related to the system configuration. Generally, let us denote by 






= − . The propagation of the too long duration failure depends on how the 




In practice, the software developers may use some "special marks" to avoid 
responding to redundant inputs. For instance, when the key "a" is pressed too long, 
the operating system generates a series of "key down" events and only one "key up" 
event when the key is released. In the implementation, the software may be designed 
to respond only to the event "key up" instead of to the event "key down" to identify 
that a key is clicked. If no such "special marks" are used, all the redundant inputs are 
sent to the software along with the expected input. Those redundant inputs are stored 
in the buffer (size N). The number of redundant inputs may be larger than the buffer 
size, so the number of redundant inputs which can be handled is ( )min , rN N . As 
shown in Figure 6-26, those redundant inputs may cause input failures in the next 
inputs. 
 





















min[ , ]N Nrt2t1t0t  
Figure 6-26 Propagation Illustration of Redundant Inputs 
The first redundant input will be used by the software at time t1 at which the 
first input after the current expected input is expected to arise. At t1, the expected 
input should be 1teI , so the propagation criterion for the first redundant input is 
( ) ( )01 tte ef I f I≠ . Similarly, the propagation criterion for the second redundant input is 
( ) ( )02 tte ef I f I≠ , so forth and so on. Then the propagation criterion for the redundant 
inputs can be expressed as: 
( ) ( ) ( )0 ,  1, 2,......,min ,it te e rf I f I i N N≠ =  (Eq.  6-18) 
Where 
ti is the time at which the ith expected input after the current expected input is 
expected to arise. 
From the above discussion, one can see that if duration is considered as a 
variable, the too long duration failure will cause a value failure. The value failure may 
be out of the range of the expected value. The incorrect value and out of range value 
will cause incorrect data state. If the duration is used as the means to identify the 
input, the too long duration failure will generate a series of redundant inputs along 




mark", the input with too long duration will be identified as one input (expected 
input). Otherwise, the redundant inputs are sent to the software and may cause 
incorrect outputs. Those propagation behaviors are summarized in Figure 6-27. 
Too Long Input Duration
No Special Marks are used
Mode 2
Mode 1
( ) ( ), , , ,,  d f d e d f d ef val f val val val≠ >Incorrect Value
Special Mark is used pp=0
( ) ( ) ( )0 ,  1,2,......,min ,it te e rf I f I i N N≠ =
Out of Range
In Range
Cause non-address-related out of range failure
 








In this chapter, we discuss how the fault propagation analysis can be applied 
to quantify the contribution of input failures to the risk by using a personal access 
control software (PACS) as example. 
7.1 PACS 
PACS is a simplified version of an automated Personal entry/exit Access 
System (PACS) used to provide privileged physical access to rooms /buildings, etc. 
The functioning of PACS is summarized as follows: A user inserts his personal ID 
card that contains his name and social security number into a reader. The system 
searches for a match in the software system database which may be periodically 
updated by a system administrator, instructs/disallows the user to enter his personal 
identification number, a 4 digit code using a display attached to a simple 12 position 
keyboard, validates/invalidates the code, and finally instructs/disallows entry into/exit 
out of the room/building through a gate. A single line display screen provides 
instructional messages to the user. An attending security officer monitors a duplicate 
message on his console with override capability [36, 37]. 
The PACS software can be divided into four components: "SwipeCard", 
"EnterPIN", "Process", and "SeeOfficer". The component "SwipeCard" is used to 
validate provided card information. We applied the fault propagation analysis only on 




i. The software waits for some user to swipe his/her ID card in the Card 
Reader, by waiting on register R6 to be set to 1 by the Card Reader – 
denoting that some ID card has been swept through the Card Reader; 
clears the register R6 by writing 0; 
ii. Then, waits for register R10 to be set to 1, denoting that the information 
from the card has been successfully read by the hardware. The software 
will wait a maximum of 5 seconds after R6 was set to 1 for R10 to become 
active (be set to 1). In case of timeout the software will assume that the 
card was unreadable, and the message “RETRY” will be sent to the user. 
iii. If R10 is set to 1 within 5 seconds indicating that the card is readable, the 
software requires a minimum of 1 second to be ready to receive the card 
information sent from the card reader. 
iv. In case of successful reading of the card, the software will check the 
security file “card.val” to determine whether the user is allowed to gain 
physical access. If the social security number and the last name don’t 
match with the entry in this file, or if the entry doesn’t exist the software 
will assume that there is some error with the card, and the message 
“RETRY” will be sent to the user. If three attempts have been tried, the 
message “See Officer” will be sent to the user and the card reader will be 




7.2 Application process 
This section discusses how to apply propagation analysis to help quantify the 
contribution of the input failures to risk. 
In addition, this section also shows that the systematic application of 
propagation analysis for the different input failure modes reduces the number of test 
cases necessary for the evaluation of the propagation probability. Actually, if the 
propagation behavior of a failure mode has been confirmed through fault propagation 
analysis, i.e., its propagation probability is 0 or 1, it becomes unnecessary to evaluate 
the impact of this failure mode through test. The steps required to quantify the 
contribution of the input failures to risk are shown in Figure 7-1. 
 
Figure 7-1 Application Process 
Step 1. Construct f the Artifact. 
Step 2. Identify the expected inputs for the scenario. 
Step 3. Identify the applicable input failure modes. 
Step 4. Identify the input failure modes whose analytical propagation 
probabilities are 1 or 0.  
Step 5. Determine the operational profile. 
Step 6. Model the failure modes whose propagation behaviors can not be 
determined by propagation analysis using TestMaster; generate test 
cases with profile coverage.  
Step 7. Execute the test cases in WinRunner and calculate the software 




Taking "SwipeCard" as an example, we illustrate the details of each step:  
Step 1: Construct the artifact. 
The available materials for this example are: the system requirement (SyRS), 
the software requirements specification (SRS), a fire hazard report, and a 
manufacturing manual for CardReader. The SyRS and SRS provide information on 
how to use the PACS software to exit the building. The fire hazard report gives 
additional information such as the fact that the computer system will normally stop 
working 10 minutes into a fire accident. The manufacturing manual provides 
information on the performance of the CardReader under special conditions. 
 
Step 2: Identify the expected inputs for the scenario. 
The event sequence diagram (ESD) for the PACS exit system is shown in 
Figure 7-2. The scenario under study is: a fire event has occurred; the fire protection 
system did not work; the emergency exit was closed; the guard was not in position 
behind the desk. The scenario is marked in the Figure 7-2. 
If the software component “SwipeCard” fails and the guard is absent, the 
PACS software can not be reset to let another user out. The exit is thus blocked and 
this will lead to the end state “Loss of Occupants”. 
The computer will stop working 10 minutes into the fire accident. However, 
as the SRS indicates, the software allows a maximum of 5 seconds to read the card 
information successfully. Otherwise, it will prompt an error message and wait for a 
reset action of the guard. Because the guard is not in position behind the desk, the 




Occupants” occurs. Hence, as soon as a card information becomes erroneous, the 
system will experience a failure. 
 
 
Figure 7-2 ESD for Exit System 
Then, the expected inputs for the software component "SwipeCard" are the 
correct cards before 10 minutes – time necessary to process the entrant. In the SRS, 
the characteristics of the expected inputs for "SwipeCard" are specified as shown in 
Table 7-1. 
Table 7-1 Characteristics of SwipeCard 
Characteristics Specification 
Value The information stored in the security file 
Type Characters array for both SSN and LastName 
Amount 2 (SSN and LastName) 
Range Exact 9 characters for SSN, up to 20 characters for LastName 
Timing Maximum 5 seconds for reading the card information 
successfully. Minimum 1 second for reading the card 
information if the card is readable. 
Duration Not specified. 





Step 3: Identify the applicable input failure modes.  
Not all the input failure modes are applicable for any given software 
component. The applicability of the input failure modes to "SwipeCard" is described 
in Table 7-2. 








The card information consists of SSN and 
LastName. Only when both SSN and LastName 
match with the record in the security file, is the 
card considered as a correct card. When the 




Both SSN and LastName are character arrays. The 
input will be treated as character by the function 
used in the software. So the type failure is not 
applicable to PACS. 
Range Out of Range SSN and LastName are not numeric type but type 
char and range failure is applicable only when the 
input is of numeric type, so the range failure is not 
applicable to PACS. 
Amount Too little, 
Too much 
The card information is comprised of the SSN and 
LastName. If either of these two parameters is 
missing, a “too little” amount failure occurs. If 
other information is provided with the SSN and 
LastName, a “too much” amount failure occurs. 
Rate Too fast, 
Too slow 
The inputs to the component do not occur 
periodically. So the rate failure is not applicable to 
PACS. 
Duration Too long, 
Too short 
If the card is swiped too quickly, the CardReader 
can not read the information encoded on the card, 
and a too short duration failure occurs. When the 
card is swiped slowly, the card reader can still read 
the card information correctly, so the “too long” 
duration failure is not applicable. 
Time Too early, 
Too late, 
omitted 
If the card information can not be read 
successfully within 5 seconds, a timeout occurs. If 
the card reader sends the card information in less 





Step 4: Identify the input failure modes whose analytical propagation probabilities 
are 1 or 0. 
According to the fault propagation analysis, some failure modes will 
propagate to the output in some situations, while some modes will not. Let us denote 
by ,1fI  and ,0fI  the failure modes whose propagation probabilities can be determined 
by fault propagation analysis as 1 and 0 respectively. The remaining failure modes 
whose propagation behaviors are not determinable by fault propagation analysis are 
denoted by ,0.5fI . Apparently, the set of input failures is the union of ,0fI , ,0.5fI , ,1fI .  
Value Failure: 
As the fault propagation analysis carried out in previous chapterss indicates, 
the propagation probability of a value failure is not determinable if no other 
information is provided. 
Timing Failure: 
If the card information can not be read successfully within 5 seconds, a “too 
late” failure occurs. Figure 7-3 describes the propagation of the “too late” failure. In 
this example, an error detection mechanism is used (case 2) and it will send message 
“Timeout” and “Retry” to the user. This message is different from the expected 
message “EnterPIN”. The “too late” failure is thus propagated.  
If the card reader sends the card information to the software less than 1 second 
after R10 is set to 1, a “too early” failure occurs. As shown in Figure 7-4, because 
there is no buffer designed for the premature input, the input will not be accepted by 
the software. Then, it will cause a “too late” failure. Hence, both the “too late” and 





Figure 7-3 Propagation of "too late" failure 
 
Figure 7-4 Propagation of "too early" failure 
 
 
Figure 7-5 Propagation of timing failures in SwipeCard 
 
Duration Failure: 
The original propagation analysis for the “too short” duration failure is shown 
in Figure 7-6. In this example, the duration is used in mode 2, i.e., used to identify the 
existence of an input. Then, the “too short” duration failure will be transformed into 




( ) ( ), , , ,, d f d e d f d ef val f val val val≠ <
 
Figure 7-6 Propagation of the "too short" duration failure 
 
Amount Failure: 
The two input elements SSN and LastName are read from the same 
component “CardReader” and SSN is read before LastName. As shown in Figure 7-7, 
SSN and LastName come from the same component, missing either of them will 
cause a “too little” amount failure. 
{ }( ) { }( ),1 ,2 , ,1 , 1 , , 1 ,, ,..., ,..., , , ,...,e e e n e e i f i f i f nf v v v f v v v v v− +≠
 
Figure 7-7 Propagation of the "too little" Failure 
 
If both SSN and LastName are missing, then the “too little” amount failure is 
transformed to the “omitted” failure which will propagate to the output. If only SSN 
is missing, part or all of the LastName will be read as SSN. Because SSN contains 
only numeric characters while LastName contains alphabetical characters, the input 
can not pass the validation stage and the failure propagates to the output. If LastName 
is missing, the input can not pass the validation stage either because there is no record 
with only SSN in the security file. Hence, the “too little” amount failure will 





Figure 7-8 Propagation of the “too little” amount failure in SwipeCard 
 
If additional elements are provided to the software, a “too much” amount 
failure occurs. The general propagation behavior of the “too much” amount failure is 
shown in Figure 7-9. In this example, all the inputs (SSN and LastName) come from 
the same device (CardReader); they are not read in the fixed format (the cardreader 
may read up to 20 characters for the LastName). If the additional elements are 
inserted after SSN, they will be treated as part of LastName and cause a value failure 
to LastName. On the other hand, if the additional element is inserted before SSN, it 
will cause a value failure to SSN and LastName (as shown in Figure 7-10). Since the 
propagation for the value failure is not determinable, the propagation for the “too 
much” amount failure can not be determined only using fault propagation analysis. 
 
 






Figure 7-10 Propagation of the "too much" amount failure in SwipeCard 
 
The result of fault propagation analysis for the applicable failure modes on 
"SwipeCard" is summarized in Table 7-3. 
Table 7-3 Result of Fault Propagation Analysis on "SwipeCard" 
Failure Mode Fault Propagation Analysis Result 
Incorrect value Not Determinable 
Too little amount Propagates 
Too much amount Not Determinable 
Too late Propagates 
Too early Propagates 
Too short duration Propagates 
 
Step 5: Determine the operational profile 
The upstream component is the CardReader. According to the manufacturing 
manual, the CardReader performs correctly with a probability 99.5%. Incorrect 
performance will cause incorrect values in 80% of the cases, missing part or all 
information in 4% of the cases, providing additional information in 3% of the cases, 
providing data too late in 10% of the cases, providing data too early in 1% of the 
cases or omitting data in 2% of the cases. The operational profile of the input failures 
is shown in Table 7-4.  
Table 7-4 Operation Profile for SwipeCard 
Failure Mode Probability 
Incorrect Value 0.8 
Too little amount 0.04 
 
Value 
Too much amount 0.03 




Too early 0.01 
Duration Too Short 0.02 
 
Step 6: Model the input failures with their associated operational profile 
As the analysis in step 3 indicates, we only need to model the “too much” 
amount failure and the “incorrect value” failure, because their propagation cannot be 
determined only using fault propagation analysis. The failure modes, ,0.5fFM ∈I , and 
their associated operational profiles are modeled using TestMaster [38].4 Because it is 
unnecessary to model the failure modes in the set ,1fI  and ,0fI  whose propagation 
behavior is readily known through fault propagation analysis, the number of test cases 
is reduced. The TestMaster models are shown in Figure 7-11 to Figure 7-14. 
 
Figure 7-11 TestMaster Model - Mainframe 
                                                 





Figure 7-12 TestMaster - Amount Failure 
 
 









Step 7: Execute test cases in WinRunner [39]5 and calculate the software failure 
probability due to input failures. The test cases generated from TestMaster are 
automatically executed in WinRunner if they are written in the WinRunner TSL script.  
After running the test cases, the probability that the software component fails 
given that an input failure has occurred can be calculated with: 
( ) ( ),1 ,0.5 ff f f f
N
prob p I p I
N
= ∈ + ∈I I  
Where 
N is the total number of test cases generated, 
Nf is the number of failures observed, 
( ),1f fp I ∈I  is the probability that an input failure comes from set ,1fI , 
( ),0.5f fp I ∈I  is the probability that an input failure comes from set ,0.5fI . 
In this example, there are two PMAs which will map to “Enter PIN” and “See 
Officer” respectively. The expected input will fall into the PMA corresponding to 
“Enter PIN”, so an input failure propagates to the output if its output is “See Officer”. 
Hence, in this example, the propagation probability equals to the probability that the 
input failure generates an output “See Officer”. 
Two hundred test cases are generated and used to test the application in this 
example, of which 195 fail (i.e., generate output “See Officer”). Hence, the 
probability that the software component "SwipeCard" will fail given the occurrence 
of an input failure is: 
                                                 





( ) ( ),1 ,0.5 1950.17 0.83 0.989200
f
f f f f
N
prob p I p I
N
= ∈ + ∈ = + × =I I  
The confidence interval can be also estimated with: 
2
2 1 / 2




















Where α is the confidence level, N is the sample size, p is the estimation of 
the probability. In this example, p is 0.989 and N is 200 / 0.83 241= . The uncertainty 
comes from the 200 test cases, because the portion of the input failure whose 
propagation probability is 1 does not contain any uncertainty. Then, the 95% 
confidence interval can be calculated as [0.952, 0.993]. 
From this example, one can see that it is not necessary to model the “too little” 
amount failure, the “too short” duration failure, the “too early” failure, and the “too 
late” failure. Hence, no test cases are generated and run for those failure modes. 
Because they correspond to 17% of all the input failures in this example, 41 





8 Conclusion and Future Research 
 
In this chapter, we conclude on the benefits that fault propagation analysis can 
bring to probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). We also identify the shortcomings and 
limitations of methods presented in this dissertation. Avenues for future research are 
subsequently identified. 
8.1 Advantages of fault propagation analysis 
The methods presented in this dissertation have the following benefits:: 
1. They provide an approach for the identification of the input failures of a 
software component. 
2. The Image Reconstruction Method provides a way to quantify the 
contribution of input failures to risk. Compared with random testing, the 
method can help reduce the number of test cases necessary for the 
evaluation of the propagation probability. The fault propagation analysis 
shows that some types of input failures will definitely propagate to the 
software output if a set of given conditions are met. It is unnecessary to 
generate test cases for such inputs. 
3. The Image Reconstruction Method could provide useful information for 
the propagation analysis of the failures of the support platform on which 
the software resides. The support failures may cause a data state error in 
an arbitrary location of the software. As described in section 4.5.5, with 




the locations where the support failure arises by simply mapping the flat 
parts in the input domain to such locations. Hence, it is not necessary to 
repeat the application of the Image Reconstruction Method in those 
locations. 
8.2 Limitation of the Methods and Future Research 
The methods presented in this dissertation have the following limitations: 
1. The analysis assumes that the software is deterministic, i.e., the software 
provides identical output given identical inputs. The analysis is invalid if 
the software is not deterministic. 
2. Although the propagation analysis has accounted for as many architectures 
(i.e. with buffer, without buffer) as possible while examining the behavior 
of timing and rate failures, it is impossible to guarantee the completeness 
of the conditions studied. However, the analysis process is valid for 
uncovered cases. The key point is to analyze how the input failures cause 
data state errors so that the propagation criteria can be formalized. 
3. Identifying the flat parts is the key process of the Image Reconstruction 
Method. Improving the identification mechanism will have a significant 
impact on the calculation efficiency. Such study will be the focus of future 
research. 
4. Currently, the fault propagation analysis is limited to considering single 
input failures. However, multiple failures are possible. For instance, in the 




redundant inputs, a possible delay may ensue. The analysis for multiple 
input failures is much more complex than that for the single input failure. 
The propagation criteria may not be a simple union of the propagation 
criteria for each single failure. The possible solution could be 1) to design 
a procedure to clearly identify possible multiple failures, 2) to study the 
interaction among multiple failures and identify new impacts other than 
the impact from a single failure, and then 3) to formalize the propagation 





Appendice A  
User Guide for TestMaster and WinRunner 
 
This section takes PACS as an example to discuss the modeling of the 
software system/components. For more information about TestMaster, please refer to 
the TestMaster’s User Guide [1]. 
TestMaster is a test design tool that uses the extended finite state machine 
notation to model a system. To model the software components and generate test 
cases using TestMaster, 3 steps need to be performed. 
1. Create Models. 
2. Define Transitions. 
3. Generate Test Cases. 
1. Create Models 
First, we need to start TestMaster from the UNIX command line by typing: 
tm [option] [projectName] 
In our example, we typed: tm pacs.tp. Then the TestMaster windows are 
shown as displayed in Figure A-1.  
 
 





TestMaster is started with a Root Model as shown in Figure A-2.  
 
 
Figure A-2 Entry Level (Root) Model 
 
According to the SRS of PACS, we divided the PACS software into 
WaitsForCardInReader, SwipeCard, EnterPIN, Proceed, SeeOfficer, and BeforeExit 
sub-models. We added these sub-models by creating state and model calls as shown 
in Figure A-3.  WaitsForCardInReader is used to model the R6 hardware failure 
before swiping the card. It should be noted that TestMaster allows the construction of 
hierarchical finite state machines. States can not be decomposed further whereas 
model calls can be further decomposed. 
 
 




Besides the model call and state, there are other modeling objects in the 
toolbar located at the top right hand section of the model window. Each object 
represents a different function in TestMaster, but each object is created, edited, and 
deleted exactly the same way. See Table A-1 for details on each object. 
Table A-1 Description of Object Toolbar 
Object Icon Description 
State 
 
A state represents a point in time, or a mode of 





A state which is a call or reference to another Model. 






A Table Model is used to enter values for variables. 
Variables created for a Table Model in the Project 
window, are automatically positioned in the top row of 
the Table. Each row in the Table Model performs 
exactly like a Transition. 
Entry 
 
The first state in every Model. No paths are generated 
without an entry state. 
Exit 
 
The last state in a Model or submodel. When the Test 
Generator reaches this State, control returns to the 
calling Model, if any. 
C_LIMB 
 
Used to model a C-based Application Programming 
Interface using C-Language Interface Model Builder 
(C_LIMB). C_LIMB automatically generates 
C_language code for each routine of the API being 
tested. 
 
2. Define Transitions 
Objects created in TestMaster are isolated of each other unless they are 
connected with at least one transition. 
A transition represents the events required to drive the test from a particular 
State or Model Call to the next State or Model Call. To create a transition, perform 




1. Position the mouse in the center of a State, Model Call or Table 
Model icon that is the starting point of the Transition, and click 
the middle mouse button. 
2. Move the cursor to the connecting State or Model Call. 
3. Click the middle mouse button in the center. The Transition is 
created. 
Transition information can be found either explicitly or implicitly in the SRS 
document. For example, the following statements from PACS SRS (see Appendix A) 
indicate transitions between sub-models as shown in Table A-2. 
 
Table A-2 SRS Statements Indication 
Tansitions Between Sub-Models  Statement in the SRS 
Origin Destination 
The user should swipe the ID Card in 
the Card Reader. 
WaitsForCardInReader SwipeCard 
PIN error, the user should see the 
officer. 
EnterPIN SeeOfficer 
ID Card error, the user should see the 
officer. 
SwipeCard SeeOfficer 
Upon successful reading of the ID 
card and finding a match in the 
security file, the user is asked to enter 
his PIN. 
SwiperCard EnterPIN 
The ID Card and PIN match, the user 
is allowed access. 
EnterPIN Proceed 
 
After adding the transitions, the highest level PACS model obtained is given 





Figure A-4 Adding Transitions 
 
More transitions may be added in the future if needed. The next step is to 
define the transitions in detail. Position the mouse on the transition you want to edit 
and right click the mouse. Choose edit transition from the drop menu, the edit 
transition window pops up as shown in Figure A-5. 
 
 
Figure A-5 Edit Transition Window 
 
A transition contains several fields including name, event, likelihood, 
predicate, constraints, actions, arguments, comment, and TEST INFO. The major 




Table A-3 Major Fields Description in a Transition 
Field Description 
Likelihood Likelihood is a field used to define the Relative Likelihood of 
Occurrence (RLOC) for a Transition. In the Likelihood field, a PFL 
Expression is entered; whose result when evaluated is an absolute 
number between 1 and infinity. 
Predicates Predicates are specifications placed on transitions as a PFL expression 
to specify the behavior of the current transition and move the test 
generator to the next state or model call. For example, k==0 
Constraints Constraints are placed on model call, states, and transitions to limit the 
number of test generated, and result in a true or false condition. For 
example, k<3. 
Action The action field is the place where dynamic context is updated. Actions 
are preformed when the transition is encountered during test 
generation. For example, k=k+1. 
TEST 
INFO 
In the TEST INFO field, you enter text, macros, or hyperlinked objects 
so their values are displayed in the resulting testing data.  
 
For example, there are two states in the sub-model WaitsForCardInReader: 
CardInReader and CardNotInReader. If we wanted to assign likelihood 99.9 and 0.1 
to them respectively, just simply enter the figures in fields of Likelihood in the two 
transitions. Likelihood information should be obtained from the operational profile.  
The information for predicates and actions can be found in the SRS. For 
example, it is stated in the PACS SRS that: 
 
- In case of failure to read the ID Card, or entering the PIN in 3 tries, an alert is 
sent to the officer. 
 
The segment “ 3tries” clearly indicates the existence of a predicate k<3 in the 
corresponding transitions. In addition, the segment also indicates that every time 
when the sub-models SwipeCard and EnterPIN are executed, the program should 
increase the counter by one. This is an action "k=k+1" in the transition between 




The TEST INFO field is used to enter the test script for the test execution tool. 
Our scripts for WinRunner are typed in the field of TEST INFO. 
Variables may be needed to perform some functions in the models. For 
example, in the model WaitsForCardInReader, we want to set a flag to represent if the 
card is in the reader. Then a variable is required. 
To create variables in a Model, complete the following steps: 
4. Locate the Model name in the Project window where the 
variable(s) will be used, or create a scope variable on the Entry 
(Root) Model, so it can be used throughout the Project. 
5. Right click the mouse on the Model name and choose Add 
Variable from the drop down menu. The Edit New Variable 
window is displayed as shown in Figure A-6. 
 
Figure A-6 Edit New Variable 
 




7. Select a Storage Class from the drop down list box in the 
Storage field. There are four options: Scope, Local, Param, and 
Ref Param. 
8. Select a data type from the drop down list box in the Type field. 
There are four data types: NUMBER, NUMBER ARRAY, 
STRING, and STRING ARRAY. 
The variables can be used after they are defined in the model. For example, 
we used two variables (Prob and CardInReader) in the model WaitsForCardInReader. 
Variable Prob is used to calculate the probability that a test goes through the path. 
Variable CardInReader is used as a flag. Applying these variables to the foregoing 
example, we could modify the model as shown in Figure A-7. 
 
Figure A-7 Transition Edited 
 
In the model, we should also tell the test executor (we use WinRunner as the 
executor) what to do during the testing. This information is written in the fields of 
TEST INFO. For example, if we want the executor to wait one second, just type 
"wait(1)" in the field of TEST INFO in the transition. For more information, please 





3. Generate Test Cases 
Before running the test, we should set some parameters for the testing. To run 
the test generator, click the Run Mode button, or choose Tests-> Run Settings from 
the project window. The run settings window is displayed as shown in Figure A-8.  
 
 
Figure A-8 Run Setting 
 
The major options in the run settings window are described in Table A-4. 
Table A-4 Run Settings Window Options 
Options Description 
Stop On Warning Aborts test generation if a run-time warning appears. 
Output To File Creates a file to write the test information. Writes the 
necessary files for test replay and formatted test file creation. 
Test Generation 
Report 
When selected, will produce an report to a default file. Each 
time the test generator is run, this file will be overwritten. 
Requirements Report When selected, the requirements report will produce a report 
of how your project met the requirements established in the 
requirements table. 
Test Limit Sets a limit on the number of tests being generated. Enter the 
maximum number of tests. 
Transitions /Path 
Limit 
Sets a limit on the number of transitions per path. Enter the 
maximum number of transitions. 




model and ever transition. 
Transition Cover Ensure that every transition is included in at least one test. 
Quick Cover Generates a minimal set of diverse tests with high model 
coverage in a relatively short time. 
Profile Cover Generates a user defined number of tests based upon the 
likelihood information included in the models, and the user 
specified constraints. 
N-Switch Cover This is a coverage that is between full and transition. 
Manual Batch Cover User specifies which models are high producers then runs 
the high path producing models in transition/full cover 
combination in order to present the user with optimal test 
sets. 
AutoBatch Cover Same as manual batch cover except that the system chooses 
the high path producers. 
 
We could choose the coverage scheme from this window and set the path 
limit, test limit and the transitions/path limit. In our case, we will mostly be using the 
Profile Cover run option. Click Run to run the test generator. After the test case 
generation, the result is output to the file assigned. 
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